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1. Introduction1 
 Coordinating for Cohesion in the Public Sector of the Future (COCOPS), as one of the largest 
comparative public management research projects in Europe, intends to provide a comprehensive 
picture of the challenges facing the public sector in European countries and to systematically explore 
the impact of New Public Management (NPM)-style reforms in Europe. The project brings together 
public administration scholars from eleven universities in ten countries2 and is funded as part of the 
European Union’s 7th Framework Programme between January 2011 and June 2014.3 The research is 
comparative and evidence-based, drawing on both existing data and innovative new quantitative and 
qualitative data collection, at both national and policy sector levels. A cornerstone of the project is 
the COCOPS Executive Survey on Public Sector Reform in Europe: an original, large-scale survey of 
public sector top executives in ten European countries, exploring executives’ opinions and 
experiences with regards to public sector reforms in general government, as well as more particularly 
in the health and employment policy sectors. 
 Scholars within the public administration discipline have long underlined the need for more 
quantitative and rigorous comparative research, going beyond single-country and single-organization 
approaches (see Derlien, 1992; Fitzpatrick et al., 2011; Pollitt, 2011; Raadschelders and Lee, 2011). 
Moreover, few research initiatives have explored in depth the transformation of public 
administrations as triggered by NPM reform discourses in a systematic comparative form (Van de 
Walle and Hammerschmid, 2011). Responding to such concerns, this survey offers systematic 
evidence regarding the dynamics of public administration reform in Europe, with the goal to create 
an encompassing and systematic picture of public administration after more than two decades of 
NPM reforms. 
 From a theoretical perspective the survey builds on the perception of three major reform 
paradigms (New Public Management, Public Governance and the Neo-Weberian State) as described 
by Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011). Focusing on top executives, it follows pioneering elite studies such as 
those of Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman (see Putnam 1976, Aberbach et al., 1981, and Aberbach 
and Rockman, 2006), which lay the foundation for many other both national and cross-national 
executive surveys (e.g. Mayntz and Derlien, 1988; Christensen and Laegreid, 2007; Bertelli et al., 
2007; Trondal, 2010; Bauer et al., 2009; COBRA survey; UDITE survey).  
 Methodologically it also draws inspiration from cross-national population surveys such as the 
European Social Science Survey, European Values Survey, the International Social Survey Program; as 
well as from experiences with cross-national surveys such as those of the Survey Research Centre at 
the University of Michigan (2010).  
 As set out by the project's terms of reference the goal of this large-scale survey is to analyse 
national administrations (both ministries and agencies) in the participating countries and also to take 
a closer look at the policy fields employment and health. The survey aims to explore public sector 
executives´ perceptions, experiences and opinions with regards to their work context and 
                                                          
1
 This introduction is based on Hammeschmid, Görnitz, Oprisor and Stimac (2013), and appears in the same 
form in all WP3 COCOPS country reports. 
2 
Erasmus University Rotterdam, Hertie School of Governance Berlin, University of Bergen, Bocconi University, 
University of Cantabria, Cardiff University,  CNRS Paris, Corvinus University Budapest, University of Exeter, KU 
Leuven, Tallinn University of Technology 
3
 More information on the project is available at www.cocops.eu 
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administrative reforms, but also on other factors such as values and identities and the impact of the 
fiscal crisis. The core survey implemented in all participating countries consists of 31 questions 
structured in four parts (I) General information; (II) Management and Work Practice of Your 
Organization; (III) Public Sector Reform and the Fiscal Crisis; (IV) Attitudes, Preferences and Personal 
Information. The survey is a result of the joint work of all the national research teams within the 
COCOPS project and under the leadership of a team of researchers at the Hertie School of 
Governance in Berlin. In addition, further universities from other European countries were included 
as strategic partners to replicate the survey in these countries.4 
 Three essential challenges connected to the design of the questionnaire and the survey 
methodology had to be handled by the research team: a sample design that would allow systematic 
comparative analyses; an access strategy to produce (statistically sufficient) high response rates; and 
a questionnaire design and translation that would assure conceptual equivalence between all 
countries. As a general principle, the survey team opted for a balanced and pragmatic approach with 
a view on a maximum of quality and comparability, while still allowing for sufficient flexibility within 
each country’s context. A core questionnaire developed by the survey team in English was translated 
into country-specific versions by the respective national research teams and – if assumed helpful – 
optional questions were added. With regards to the population definition, the research team 
targeted a group with relevant experience to assess overall developments and trends both on an 
organizational and policy field level. In general, top executives are viewed as such informants 
regarding the state of administration, given their privileged vantage point (Walker and Enticott, 
2004), but also, with the blurring of the classical boundaries between politicians and civil servants 
(Aberbach et al., 1981), due to their own role in policy-making and their influence on the choice and 
implementation of reforms (Christensen and Lægreid, 1999; Ridder et al., 2006). A major critique 
raised against elite surveys however (see in particular Enticott et al., 2008) is that they usually focus 
on a limited selection of individuals at the top of the organization. As these individuals are relatively 
disconnected from processes at lower levels in the organizations, and also due to issues of 
desirability, such an approach is bound to provide a biased image of the respective organization(s). 
These are important points to take into consideration when interpreting the results. 
 In order to avoid random sampling and issues of representativeness, the COCOPS executive 
survey is based on a full census of all central government ministries and agencies. It covers all high 
level public sector executives who in their respective positions can be expected to be involved in 
public administration reform processes. A core set of binding sample principles, based on a detailed 
mapping of national administrative structures, was followed by all teams in all central government 
areas and especially in the case of employment and health. Deviations were only allowed if precise 
equivalence could not be established due to the specificity of administrative structures. Local 
government and service delivery levels were excluded for the purpose of this survey. Generally, 
within all central government ministries and subordinated agencies the two top-administrative levels 
were addressed; in some cases invitations were also sent to executives on the third level if, due to 
their policy relevance, this was deemed appropriate. State-owned enterprises and audit courts were 
not included due to their different task repertoire. In the fields of employment and health, as special 
                                                          
4 The Vienna University of Economics and Business for Austria, the Kaunas University of Technology for 
Lithuania, the Technical University of Lisbon for Portugal, Copenhagen Business School, the Belgrade Fund for 
Political Excellence for Serbia and the University of Bern for Switzerland 
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focus areas, regional and state government ministries and agencies were  also included if relevant – 
without addressing however direct service delivery levels (e.g. hospitals, job centers).  
 Moreover, the survey explicitly covers different units of analysis (see Pollitt 2011: 121, on 
units of analysis in comparative public administration research) to allow for multi-level analyses: 
policy field, organization and individual experiences of the respondent. These are explored through 
the (self)perceptions of public sector executives, acknowledged in research as the closest channel 
into objective processes and developments within public organizations and, at least in the absence of 
stringent limitations, as reliable predictors of administrative behaviour (see Aberbach et al., 1981; 
Bauer et al., 2009). 
 The survey was implemented online, with standardized webpages being built in the national 
language(s) for each country. Flexibility was allowed, and even recommended, in the data collection 
strategies used by national teams, due to major differences in administrative cultures between the 
countries. A major emphasis was put on a thorough data cleaning and harmonization at the end of 
the survey, to make sure that final results were comparable across countries and that any deviations 
allowed during the implementation process were explained and controlled.5  
 The survey was launched in May 2012 and implemented in two rounds (May-July 2012, and 
September-November 2012). In these two rounds combined, the survey was sent out to over 20.000 
high ranking civil servants in the ten participating countries via post and email (using either a 
personalized access link or an anonymous one), depending on each country´s predefined access 
strategy. Invitations were followed by reminders and, in cases where response rates were low, teams 
took additional measures, such as phone or postal reminders, to increase the number of survey 
participants. In the beginning of November 2012, all surveys were closed, and all datasets were 
cleaned, checked and harmonized according to a standardised procedure for all countries. 
Table 1. Number of invitations and response rates of the COCOPS survey (by end of December 2012) 
Country Invitations Sent* 
Survey 
completions 
Response rate % 
Austria 1745 637         36.50  
Estonia 913 321         35.16  
France 5297 1193         22.52  
Germany  2295 566         24.66  
Hungary 1200 351         29.25  
Italy 1703 343         20.14  
Netherlands 977 293         29.99  
Norway 1299 436         33.56  
Spain 1778 321         18.05  
UK 3100 353         11.39  
Total 20307 4814         23.71  
*The invitations sent represent the final number of invitations that has reached respondents, after the exclusion of any 
failure deliveries, wrong addresses etc.  
                                                          
5
 The details of the survey design and implementation process can be found in the survey Research Report (see 
Hammerschmid, Oprisor, Stimac, 2013). 
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 By the end of 2012 there were 4814 valid answers available from ten participating countries 
and an overall response rate of 23.7% (for details see Error! Not a valid bookmark self-reference.). 
These answers are the basis for the respective country reports. The data in both the national and the 
integrated datasets are subject to strict anonymity regulations, to protect individual respondents, 
whereas aggregate data will be published according to a set of rules commonly agreed upon by the 
research teams involved. 
 The current country report summarizes the findings for France along with some first 
comparisons with the aggregate results from all of the ten validated surveys in Austria, Estonia, 
France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain and UK. A more systematic 
comparative report based on these country reports will follow in summer 2013.    
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2. Context of Public Administration Reform in France 
The French bureaucracy has often been considered as one of the most « frozen » public 
administrations, ranked with other continental European (Germany) or Napoleonic states (Spain or 
Italy). In some recent studies, France was still portrayed as a laggard in terms of administrative 
reforms (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004) or a main resistant to the influence of New Public Management 
ideas (Rouban, 2006), echoeing the historical success of French sociologist Michel Crozier’s theory 
viewing France as a “stalled society” with a “stalled state” (Crozier, 1964 ; Crozier, 1970). Of course, it 
is well known that administrative reforms did not play in France, in the eighties and nineties, the 
dominant role they had in Anglo-American and Antipodean countries; they also did not claim the 
same disruptive intentions and did not initially plan the same “paradigmatic” turn aimed at changing 
the very nature of the administrative system. However, lessons drawn from the policy analysis 
approach (where incremental changes are valued) and from neo-institutionalist theories (insisting in 
the national and original specificity of reform trajectories due to institutional constraints and 
structuring historical patterns) invite to more diverse kind of lenses to describe changes. In a 
nutshell, framing the analysis in terms of inertia would be rather misleading. The first reason is that 
the policies of administrative reforms have developed intensively in the French context as elsewhere, 
with specificities (Bezes, 2009; Bezes, Parrado, 2013), that may be related to the kind and modes of 
changes occurring in a ‘Napoleonic’ state (Ongaro, 2009) or as a Continental State (see Pollitt, 
Bouckaert, 2011). Other reasons refer to the need to insist upon the importance of low-profile or 
gradual modes of changes (Bezes, 2007) or upon long-term perspective (Bezes, 2009) in the context 
of resilient institutions. Another argument is that New Public Management ideas did develop and 
diffuse in the French context but with specific institutional constraints (Rouban, 2008; Bezes, 2012). 
At last, authors have also emphasized the specificities of ministries, some of them (Public Work, 
Health, Education) developing their own dynamic of administrative changes and their own 
accommodation of managerial tools (Jeannot, Guillemot, 2010; Guillemot, Jeannot, 2013).  
Like in the US, administrative reforms in France first emphasized the techniques of Planning, 
Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) through the Rationalization of Budgetary Choices (RCB). 
Launched in January 1968, the RCB policy had three different aims: developing micro-economic tools 
(cost–benefit analysis) to improve the quality of decision-making through optimizing techniques; 
rationalizing the budget process by using a planning-oriented approach to developing a program 
budget; developing managerial tools to favour the steering of public policies. During the seventies, 
this programme slowly declined while alternative approaches focussing on citizens’ rights developed 
and resulted in several laws actually imposing new constraints on public administrations in defence 
of users. In the early since the early eighties, many reforms have been set on the agenda and 
implemented with various results in France, under the name of « modernization of administration », 
« administrative reforms » or « state reform ».  
 
In the early 1980s, France first dealt with decentralisation policies rather than going on 
focusing on efficiency or managerial tools. In 1981, the territorial decentralisation of the Lois Defferre 
enhanced the status and power of local authorities and created a constitutional and political 
counterbalance within the French regime (Thoenig, 1985; Le Lidec, 2001). The territorial 
decentralisation was first a response to concerns about the distribution of political power, not about 
administrative inefficiencies. Competences were transferred to local authorities in several domains 
(social action, housing, education, culture, transports, sea affairs) but without clearly distinguishing 
between state and sub-national governments.  
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The first version of ‘managerial reform’ in the French context was ‘invented’ between 1984-
1986 under Prime Minister Fabius, continued in another form by Chirac government (1986-1988) and 
perfected in 1989 with the policy entitled ‘Public Service Renewal’ (PSR), initiated by the Prime 
Minister Michel Rocard (1988-1991). The modernization program was close to the ‘Public Service 
Orientation’ model of NPM reforms identified by Ferlie et al. (1996) or the egalitarian one proposed 
by Christopher Hood (1998). It valued service quality, user concerns, some managerial techniques 
and a continuing set of distinctive public service orientations with strong participation of public 
servants and control through mutuality. The reform claimed an explicit link to public service values of 
public servants (Jeannot, 2006). Experiments and learning processes were favoured as the dominant 
style of reform. In a context of major social unrest within the public sector in 1988-1989, the 
‘Renewal’ program (Le renouveau du service public of February 1989) offered an acceptable trade-off 
by enhancing civil service unions, human resources management and the social dialogue and by 
introducing managerial principles and techniques such as a policy evaluation program. It also 
experimented with forms of contracts between ministries, the Civil Service Ministry and the Budget 
Ministry, the latter being rather reluctant to commit into managerial instruments in the 1980s 
(Chaty, 1997;Jeannot, 2003 ;Bezes, 2009). Incremental budgetary micro-changes were adopted in the 
1990s: ‘aggregated headings’ intended to give ministerial managers latitude in how to (re)allocate 
appropriations; contracting between central administrations, state local units and the Budget 
Directorate was experimented; more control over spending at the territorial level was adopted. 
Ideas, policy instruments, goals and the scope of reform were largely redesigned by the mid-1990s, 
to such an extent that the New Public Management ‘tool-kit’ gradually became the dominant 
inspiration in administrative reform policies (Bezes, 2005; 2009; 2012). At the same time, however, 
NPM ideas became more influent and growingly adopted by top bureaucrats from the French Grands 
corps through repeated state reform committees and reports (ibid.)  
As a result of these ongoing processes unleashed in the 1990s, many comprehensive and 
drastic changes have occurred since the early 2000s. The major change for the French administrative 
system – specifically in terms of adoption of NPM methods and tools - has come from the 2001 
reform of the French budgetary procedure. The reform was voted through the Institutional Act on 
Budget Legislation (Loi organique relative aux lois de finances, called “LOLF”), adopted on August 1st 
2001 and implemented since January 2006. The 2001 Budget Act systematised the use of NPM 
instruments (programme-oriented budgets, a new performance management system, a ‘real cost’ 
approach to policy, aggregated headings, constraining capping tools for staff expenditure and a new 
accountability framework for Parliament). It has also created a lever for further reforms (Bezes, 
2010b; Corbett, 2010). The reform helps reasserting executive control over ministries and gradually 
increased constraints over many autonomous bodies (établissements publics). Seveal scholars have 
questioned the real effects of this performance steering by policy program and have specifically 
doubted the  relevance of the indicators used (Brunetière, 2006) or, more broadly, have identified 
new forms of bureaucratization by numbers that destroy the effects of delegation of responsibility 
and increased autonomy also included with the Budget Act (Boussard, Loriol, 2008). 
During the 1990s and early 2000s, the process of agencification was not absent in the French 
context but it was unsystematic and limited compared to other European countries (United Kingdom, 
the Netherlands) (Bezes, Fimreite, Le Lidec, Laegreid, 2013). The creation of new autonomous public 
bodies dominantly took the legal form of the établissements publics, used since decades for many 
already existing autonomous public bodies (Rochet, 2002; Lafarge, 2011; Conseil d’Etat, 2012). New 
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agencies were numerous in Agriculture, Health and Risk, Social Affairs, Culture and Research, within 
this legal form of établissements publics.  
After the election of President Sarkozy, a General Public Policy Review was  launched in July 
2007 with explicit reference to the Canadian Program Review initiated by the Liberal Chretien 
Government in 1995-1996 or the ‘spending reviews’ done in UK since 2002 (Bezes, 2010a; Lafarge, 
2010). The French Révision Générale des PolitiquesPubliques (RGPP) claims to engage in “rethinking 
the state” with direct ties to the fiscal imperatives of dealing with the debt and the deficit. Ministries 
were questioned over whether their current objectives, instruments and ways of implementing and 
financing specific public policies should be maintained or whether and how goods could be delivered 
better and less expensively. Audits of organizations and public policies were conducted by several 
small ‘teams’ mixing members of ministerial and interministerial inspectorates with consultants,  the 
first time that the  resort to private consultancy firms has been publicly endorsed. From 2007 to 
2012, this process of reform generated three dynamics of transformation of the state organizational 
form with sharp and specific impacts on the territorial state, the many ministerial field units and the 
prefects (Bezes, Le Lidec, 2010; Poupeau, 2011). First, boundaries between ministries were redrawn 
and the number of full ministers was significantly reduced leading to the creation of meta-ministries. 
In all ministries, central administrative directorates were merged. Second, the territorial state 
administration was reorganized at the regional and the départemental levels through many mergers 
affecting nearly all state local units. It was decided to reorganize the regional units of central 
government ministries in accordance with a top-down ministerial logic, merging the 23 ministerial 
regional directorates into eight regional directorates which boundaries globally fit the new “big 
ministries”. At the départemental level, a tightened organization of state services was also set up by 
the creation of two or three inter-ministerial Directorates, thus merging the dozen of pre-existing 
ministerial directorates at the départemental level. Third, a new hierarchy between administrative 
levels was introduced related to a repositioning of the prefects. The regional level is now the main 
level for the steering and the implementation of public policies; the départemental level is said to be 
the locus ‘where the state adapts to the needs of citizens on a geographical basis’. As a consequence, 
the regional prefect is now considered as the pilot, guarantor of cohesion, coordinator and arbitrator 
in state interministerial action in the context of a reorganized regional level. Prefects of 
départements have reinforced their interministerial powers and therefore are said to command 
directly a tightened organization of state services at the départemental level.  
Within the same General Review of Public policies, several austerity measures also affected the civil 
service. The first pay measure introduced by Nicolas Sarkozy’s government was a freeze on the point 
value of civil service pay from 2010. Point value grew by 2.8% over the period 2008-2011, at a time 
when inflation was 4.4%, bringing a real terms salary cut of 1.6%. A second austerity measure was to 
reduce the number of civil servants and conduct corresponding reorganisations. The measure was 
embodied in a slogan: “the non replacement of one in two retiring civil servants”. In this sense, 
cutting Government service jobs was effective: 75,000 jobs cut in 2008, 45,000 in 2009, which 
represents 5% of Government jobs over those two years. This led to a fall in staff costs in the national 
budget (from 43% in 2008 to 36.5% in 2010).   
 Considering the overall series of sequences of administrative reforms, there is no doubt that 
the French trajectory of reforms has been influenced by key politico-administrative components of 
the French bureaucracy. Of course, these influences are not systematic and should be analyzed in 
context. However, in order to provide a broad view of these potential institutional constraints, we 
can emphasize four dimensions.  
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The two first are related the degree of pervasiveness, of the administrative system, e.g. the 
range of competences that come under the central government’s direct leverage and the type of 
networks of organizations and agents through which government exercises its power. The French 
state has been recognized as the archetype of a ‘unitary and centralized state’ – a ‘Napoleonic state’ 
- with strong national integration through a single territorial administrative structure (Crozier, 
Thoenig, 1975; Grémion, 1976). First, national ministerial administrations have subnational units 
representing subdivisions of the national ministries both at the regional and at the départemental 
levels. However, second, these regional and départemental directorates are also ‘supervised’ by a 
‘prefect’ who is an agent of the whole government. These lines have designed a territorially based 
and vertically integrated administrative system, both from the ministerial point of view and from the 
more political one with the political control defended by prefects. These state field units and the role 
of the prefects were challenged from the decentralisation policies of the early 1980s to the 2000s. 
The reorganisation of the territorial state and the redefinition of the position of prefects were 
repeatedly put on the agenda, but the games at work in these reforms—opposing central ministries, 
state ministerial units, prefects and local authorities—resulted in incremental reforms that were 
barely implemented (Bezes, Le Lidec, 2010). The second related feature regards the state structure. 
Although France has been historically considered as a centralized state, local representatives and 
authorities always played a major role at the central level within Republican regimes in France and 
obtained benefits (Le Lidec, 2001). In this context, decentralisation has always been ‘the’ major early 
‘reactive’ reform that induced reinforcing effects and changed the ‘Napoleonic’ state (Le Lidec, 2007, 
Bezes, Parrado, 2013), for instance with a new decentralization Act in 2003-2004.  
The third component is the degree of legal entrenchment, e.g. the extent to which the French 
administration is circumscribed by standard operating procedures and rules. France established a 
large and separate body of administrative law, consisting of a coherent legal doctrine that covered 
bureaucratic activities. This extensive and powerful system of law was supported by university-
trained lawyers. As a result, the French administrative system was characterized by complex legal 
entrenchment, ranging from a strong legal body of provisions ruling bureaucratic life as well as a 
statute that organizes the professional life of all civil servants (statut general des fonctionnaires) 
(Dreyfus, 2000). The existence of this ‘rigid [legal] backbone’ (Knill, 1999, p. 115) explains why any 
‘new’ types of ideas – such as the ‘new public management’ movement’ – have been filtered. The 
existence of specific training schools designed to train upper-level civil servants (at the top of them, 
the Ecole nationale d’administration, Eymeri, 2001) is another institutional related feature that even 
accentuated this trend (Bezes, Jeannot, 2011).  
The fourth and last component concerns the political-administrative nexus and points to the 
relationship between politicians and bureaucrats ‘at the top’. On the political side, the French Fifth 
Republic is often referred to as a semi-presidential regime. The hybrid nature of its politico-
administrative system lies in the fact that, although its Constitution of the 4th of October 1958 has 
established a parliamentary system, both the institutional practice and the constitutional reforms 
have increasingly strengthened the predominance of the President compared with the Prime 
Minister. The President was initially elected for seven years – while the members of the National 
Assembly’s term lasts five years – but the constitutional reform in 2000 has made the president and 
the deputies’ term match; both now last five years, (theoretically) reducing the probability of 
’cohabitation’ between a President originating from a different party than his or her Prime Minister. 
From this reform, results the alignment of the cycles of presidential and parliamentary elections. The 
fact that the presidential election is now scheduled just before the parliamentary elections has 
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strengthened the presidency. The political system is characterized by an election by majority vote 
with two ballots combined with a relative bipartisanship, which seemed relatively threatened by the 
emergence of less consensual parties that are the Front de Gauche (a leftist scission of the Socialist 
Party), or the Front National (extreme right).  
Broadly speaking, by reinforcing the presidential and governmental executive against the 
Parliament, the Fifth Republic has given great strength to top civil servants and has designed fairly 
politicised minister/mandarin relations. On the one hand, the French administration relies on a vast 
majority of state civil servants who are recruited through competitive exams, trained in schools and 
promoted through rationalized mechanisms. The global image that results from these mechanisms is 
well known: a unified merit and career based civil service system, traditionally associated with the 
idea of a strong state tradition (État is always capitalised) and the concept of service public 
encompassing an extensive number of public activities (from sovereign functions to industrial and 
commercial public services). Its legitimacy is rooted in the dominant values defining the “service of 
the state”. They emphasize the idea of a disinterested civil servant serving the general interest and 
guarding the public good while also promoting the principles of impartiality, equality, adaptability 
and continuity. On the other hand, forms of politicization at the top have always persisted and have 
even been continuously and growingly used as structuring means for steering, producing loyalty and 
controlling administration at higher level through ministerial cabinets and discretionary 
appointments (political loyalty is there in balance with expertise and competences).  The first main 
layer of this “politicization” process at the top is the recruitment to ministerial cabinets. A second 
form of politicization has been the full use of discretionary powers to appoint the top management 
positions in central administrations and even more political nominations for which recruitment 
belongs to the President and the government, specifically negotiated with the Prime Minister during 
the power-sharing periods (for an overview on the all period, Bezes and Le Lidec 2007). There is no 
surprise then that these various dynamics of politicization have resulted in increasing forms of 
“strategic politicization” (Rouban 2004) or “functionally politicized” involvements among top civil 
servants (Eymeri 2003; Bezes and Le Lidec 2007; Rouban 2009) characterised by strategic overview of 
a specific policy, stronger commitments to the objectives, political choices and results of this policy 
and personal loyalty to the minister in charge. Intensification of this politicization has been described 
for the recent Sarkozy period (Rouban, 2009; Bezes, Le Lidec, 2011). In the recent context, French top 
civil servants have also been challenged by the growing influence of consultants (Bezes, 2012; 
Gervais, 2012).  
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3. Data and Method 
3.1 Sampling and Access Strategy and Survey Implementation 
The French COCOP survey was conducted by Philippe Bezes from CERSA (CNRS, University Paris II) 
and Gilles Jeannot from Latts (CNRS, École des ponts, Paris-East University). 
The sampling base consisted of a core and several additional sources.The core comprises all the 
upper echelons of the civil service, defined as:the top and second levels of responsibility in the 
central administration (1st secretary, director, deputy director, 2nd deputy director); the top level of 
responsibility in the prefectures (prefect and secretary), in the regional ministerial directorates 
(director and deputy director), in the départemental directorates (départemental director) now 
made interministerial, in the regional divisions represented at départemental level (territorial unit 
heads, UT) and in the French equivalents of Government agencies (mostly “public establishments” 
with the status of legal entities and SCN – Services with National Prerogatives), where the directors 
and deputy directors were surveyed. In the decentralized French government system6, all these civil 
servants, with the exception of a few agency directors, work directly for central government, 
whatever their geographical location. 
In accordance with the general direction of the survey, the health and employment sectors were the 
focus of wider investigation. As regards health, as well as the employees of central government 
ministry of Health and the first level at the regional and départemental levels, the sample was 
extended to the second level of executives located in the Health Regional Units at the regional level 
(within the ARS – regional health agencies) or at the départemental Health Unit (within the 
départemental units of the ARS named “délégation territorial”). As regards employment, the first 
two levels of responsibility in the “Pôle Emploi”, the new agency in charge of employment, were 
targeted, including – apart from the central management posts – the regional directors and territorial 
directors of the Employment Section (positioned at départemental level), and the regional 
directorates of the AFPA (National Association for Adult Vocational Training).In addition, because 
certain aspects of employment have been decentralized to the regions, the first level of elected sub-
government in France, our sample included the people responsible for “employment and training” 
policies in regional government.This last category, however, comprises a small number of people (22) 
and does not significantly alter the state-centred character of the survey sample. 
In addition, an additional “light” version of the survey (by e-mail only) has conducted with the third 
level of responsibility in central government, the “bureau heads” (chefs de bureau).These 
administrative managers have significantly less responsibility than regional directors or 
départemental directors of state decentralized services, and as a result affect the homogeneity of the 
target sample. On the other hand, a “bureau head” in a central government ministry holds a top level 
of responsibility, often assigned to young potential highflyers. 
                                                          
6 
This notion of ‘decentralized’ system only emphasizes here the fact that the French state and its ministries 
historically have a strong network of ministerial units at the regional and départemental levels. This is what we 
called the French territorial state. The ‘decentralized’ or territorial state has nothing to do with the politics of 
decentralization or devolution, launched in the early 1980s and aimed at transferring competences from the 
national state and its ministries to elected subnational governments e.g. the regions, the départements and the 
municipalities, the three kind of local governments and local authorities we have in France.  
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We have chosen to present here the averages for the whole sample. Clearly, this can give rise to 
some distortion. The health and, in particular, the employment sectors are more marked by the 
agency model and for this reason more committed to New Public Management approaches. 
Perceptions become more critical further down the hierarchy, and the introduction of bureau heads 
tends to reinforce pessimism about the reforms. 
The sample was compiled from a government database, produced by a private publisher (the Bottin 
administratif published by LexisNexis) seen as the reference for government service at this level. This 
meant that the survey was entirely independent of government. The questionnaire was sent both by 
post and e-mail. The respondents had the choice of returning the paper version of the questionnaire 
or logging on to the online website. 
The questionnaire essentially stays close to the core survey questionnaire. Because, for reasons of 
anonymity, there were no codes that could identify the respondent, it was important to be able to 
determine the position of each of them in the hierarchy. Thus, additional questions were included to 
help situate each respondent in the specific context of the French system (e.g. prefect,…) and clearly 
differentiate the different positions in the regional and départemental organizations of ministries.  
The questionnaire was sent by post and e-mail on 21 May 2012, and several e-mail reminders were 
sent up to the end of June 2012. This period, which was set to match the European project timetable, 
corresponds in the French case to particular circumstances. It fell between the presidential elections 
of 22 April and 6 May 2012 (which led to a change of regime with the election of François Hollande) 
and the legislative elections (3 and 17 June 2012). The questionnaire response period therefore 
corresponded to a time of political transition, a period of relative calm for senior executives, when 
they attend to day-to-day affairs while awaiting new government guidelines. From the perspective of 
senior civil servants, it may also have been a good time to take stock of the fairly drastic 
administrative reforms introduced during the mandate of President Sarkozy, as part of what was 
then called the General Public Policy Review. In fact, certain survey questions asking for an 
assessment of the “last five years” may have had particular resonance in the French system, in which 
presidential elections take place every five years. These two reasons, along with the fact that very 
few independent questionnaire-based surveys on this scale have been conducted in France, may 
explain the very high response rate from the core survey sample: around 30% of top-flight 
executives. However, there is a question mark over the bias introduced by this particular 
conjuncture. Were there more responses from senior executives with reasons to be particularly 
satisfied or dissatisfied, than from the others? This kind of bias is very difficult to assess, and the 
results may reflect a degree of distortion. Nevertheless, the distribution of responses to the most 
general questions on the five-year assessment (e.g. question 16) or on the success or failure of the 
reforms, is reassuring. First, a good half of respondents gave an average response, and second the 
proportion of very negative responses is similar to that of very positive responses. This means that 
even if the people who took the opportunity to give very extreme responses are overrepresented, 
the impact on the averages is likely to be partly offset. 
In all, 5886 people were contacted by both post and e-mail, and 2618 only by e-mail, making an 
initial sample of 5886 people. We count 5297 if we consider a 10% people not reached (false 
addresses etc.) corresponding at post and mail non delivery notification. This figure can be compared 
with the socio-professional breakdown of civil servants in 2009, which identified11,141 “civilian and 
military executive personnel”, a very much smaller figure than the 179,421 classified as “category A 
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excluding teachers” in the General Government Database, quoted in the annual report on the state 
of the public services, facts and figures 2010-2011, p. 146 and 355.The homogeneous category that 
forms the central core of the sample thus corresponds to a narrow definition, which represents the 
upper quartile of “civilian and military executive personnel” in terms of socio-professional status and 
category. 
The overall response rate is easy to assess from the number of questionnaires sent, without double 
counting, and the number of returns. By contrast, a sector-based assessment is trickier. A prefect 
with general powers may have answered “employment” without being included in the invitations 
sent for that sector, which means that the response rates are undoubtedly overstated. This is 
particularly true for the employment sector, where we also find a low response rate from people 
working for the employment agency (Pôle Emploi), in other words who ticked both the 
“employment” sector and “agency” options. 
Table 2. Numbers of sent questionnaires, received responses and responses rates 
  Sent % of Sent Responses 
%of  
responses 
Response 
rate 
State central directors 303 6% 60 5% 20% 
State central deputy directors 462 9% 143 12% 31% 
Third level state central "chefs de bureau" 2267 43% 301 25% 13% 
Prefects 199 4% 44 4% 22% 
State regional directors 253 5% 102 9% 40% 
State departmental directors 547 10% 237 20% 43% 
Other local state administration 508 10% 146 12% 29% 
Agency directors 440 8% 74 6% 17% 
Other agency 319 6% 72 6% 23% 
Total 5297 100% 1193 100% 22% 
            
First and second level state administration 2087 39% 660 55% 32% 
State administration (non agency) 4539 86% 1033 87% 23% 
Health 424 8% 190 16% 45% 
Employment 411 8% 155 13% 38% 
 
Another significant result is the high response rate for the core survey from directors of central 
government units in prefectures and in regional ministerial units as well as for central government 
deputy directors (32%). Certain subsequent analyses of the data will be based on this smaller sample, 
which gives a more uniform picture of the population of “senior executives” in government service in 
France. 
Remark: Most of the questions took the form of responses on a scale running from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Unless otherwise stated, the percentages provided correspond to the 
sum of responses 1 and 2 for negative views, and of 6 and 7 for positive views. This corresponds to 
strong responses in either direction. 
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3.2 Organizational Context of Respondents 
Sector Type – A sector-based analysis of the responses reveals that some sectors are more 
represented than others. It is tricky to relate this to the characteristics of the initial questionnaire, 
firstly because French ministries do not always correspond to the proposed classification, and 
secondly because people belonging to just one ministry may have ticked several sectors. Prefects 
often indicated that they were part of several sectors, not simply one general government category. 
Figure 1. Policy field sample shares 
 
The sectors most represented in the responses reflect the initial database. For example, there is the 
Ministry of Ecology, whose responsibilities go beyond the environment alone, and at the regional and 
départemental level cover infrastructures, housing and agriculture. This ministry’s share in the initial 
database is some 14 %, which is a bit less than the final responses. Some of these respondents may 
also have ticked “other social” if they work in the housing or “transport” sector. In France, the 
economics and finance functions are part of a single ministry which, like the ministry of ecology, is 
strongly represented at regional level. This group represents 21% of our initial database, which is 
more than each of the separate components in the final population, but less than the sum of the 
two, which may mean there were duplicate responses. 
Table 3. Relative shares of ministries in initial database 
Foreign Affairs Finance Economy Ecology Defence Justice Home Office 
6% 12% 9% 14% 7% 2% 10% 
       
Employment Health Social Education Culture Leisure Agriculture Total 
8% 8% 7% 7% 4% 7% 100% 
 
As already noted, the health sector is overrepresented and the defence and foreign affairs sectors 
underrepresented. The security sector is difficult to isolate, since it is part of the Ministry of the 
Interior. 
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Sectors of economy and finance and infrastructure, transport and environment, are sectors that 
globally employ large numbers of people in government service, respectively 9 % for the economics 
and finance ministry and 4% for the Ministry of Ecology, Energy, Sustainable Development and the 
Sea in 2010 (annual government service report, 2012 edition).The National Education and Higher 
Education sectors, which accounted for 49 % of total public sector employees in 2010 and Defence 
(15 %), 7 are clearly underrepresented in the responses, but they were not targets of the COCOPS 
survey. 
Figure 2. Organization type and size shares 
 
Organization Type – As regards organizational level, we find that a significant proportion of 
respondents come from central government ministries (42%) but also that the other almost equally 
large contingent consists of senior central government executives working at regional and 
départemental level for ministries (40%).The response rates are instructive because they reveal a 
significant distortion with a medium response rate from central government directors (20 %) and, 
conversely, a very high response rate from directors of ministerial services at the regional level (40 
%) and ministerial services at the départemental level (43 %). The global low response rate from 
central government is notably explained by a fairly low rate of response at the third level of 
responsibility in central government service, i.e. the bureau heads. This lower response may perhaps 
be explained by the fact that this group was contacted solely by e-mail. By contrast, the response 
rate from the directors of regional ministerial services and even more from services at the 
départemental level is extremely high. One factor that may explain these high response rates is that 
these echelons were very strongly affected by the structural reforms carried out between 2007 and 
2012. It may be that they were more inclined to respond than other groups. 
This leads to a doubling in the representation of the regional and départemental levels, with a similar 
apparent distortion. There is less distortion with regard to the representation of agencies. 
Organization Size: The first observation is that a majority of respondents (57 %) work in 
organizations with less than 500 employees, 39% with between 100 and 499 employees. This figure is 
slightly higher than the average for the total COCOPS sample (51 %). On the other hand, 19 % of 
                                                          
7 The total was 2,307,492 employees in 2010. 
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respondents come from organizations with more than 5000 employees, a figure higher than the 
COCOPS average (17 %). 
 
3.2 Socio-demographic Background of Respondents 
Gender – The percentage of women who answered the questionnaire (approximately 30%) is 
comparable with the proportion of women amongst “civilian and military executive personnel”, 
where the level is 25%.In so far as female representation decreases the further up the hierarchy one 
goes because of the so-called “glass ceiling” effect (the proportion of female “administrative 
managers” is 46%), and because the sample group is smaller than that of “civilian and military 
executive personnel”, it may be considered that women respondents are slightly overrepresented. 
Age: The great majority of respondents (60 %) are aged between 36 and 55, with a group of 34 % 
between 56 and 65.These results are close to the average for the COCOPS sample. We have no 
general data that can be used to calibrate the responses on age. 
 “All other things being equal” the first analyses of the effects of age and gender variables bring up 
some surprises. As regards gender, women seem to display stronger approval for determined action. 
As regards age, the younger respondents seemed less committed to their organization and more 
negative in their assessment of the reform process. 
Hierarchical Level 
The first two levels of responsibility, which represent the core of the survey, formed half of the initial 
database and ultimately account for 61% of the final responses. This paradoxical result reflects the 
lower level of response from bureau heads (the third level).However, the proportion of third level 
executives is still high (39 %), which is explained by our decision to extend the sample to bureau 
heads in central government ministries and by the presence of division heads in regional ministerial 
bodies. 
Education 
A very large majority of respondents had at least the equivalent of a Masters degree (80 %) which, in 
the French context, encompasses a very wide range of backgrounds, from non-ENA educated civil 
servants in ministerial units at the regional and départemental levels with a Masters level 
qualification, to graduates of the grandes écoles and ENA (national school of administration), the 
equivalent of a Masters degree, more present at central level of ministries. More specifically, 26 % of 
our respondents were graduates of grandes écoles. We do not have the data to give a finer 
breakdown of the responses on educational level. At best, we can say that this level of 80% is above 
average for the COCOPS sample (69 %), reflecting a high level of qualification, probably attributable 
to the influence of the grandesécoles in France. The low percentage of respondents with a PhD 
(10%), on the other hand, is in marked contrast, below the COCOPS average of 15.5% and much 
lower, for example, than the German sample, where 31.5% of respondents had a doctorate. Only 3% 
of the respondents in our sample had only the baccalaureate or no qualifications at all, which is much 
lower than the level for the COCOPS sample as a whole (16%). 
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Figure 3. Socio-demographic shares (f.l.t.r.) Gender, Age, Hierarchy in organization, Educational background 
 
If we look at background educational disciplines, it emerges that law (25 %) and political science and 
public administration (24 %) – the influence of the institutes of political studies and ENA (national 
school of administration) is apparent here – account for 48 % of respondents. France’s big 
engineering schools are another significant player, with the result that scientific and technical 
qualifications are high up in the educational rankings (28 %).Also worth emphasizing is the significant 
influence of business studies, which account for one fifth of the sample (19 %), a fact growingly 
observed.  
Figure 4. Educational fields (respondents could check more than one field) 
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Tenure 
69 % of respondents had been in the public sector for more than 20 years, and 22 % for between 10 
and 20 years, whereas only 3% had less than 5 years of service. These figures show the significance of 
a career commitment to public service and promotion based on length of service. Indeed, 40% of the 
respondents had been in their organization for more than 10 years, which suggests that this is the 
place where they have made their careers and achieved promotion. Nonetheless, this figure is 
slightly below the average for the total COCOPS sample (48 %).The figures on internal mobility are 
less clear-cut, since 75% of the respondents have been in their posts for 1 to 5 years and only 5% for 
more than 10 years, the latter result being below the COCOPS average of 16%.This implies that 
access to senior positions is subject to significant uncertainties and movements, notably associated 
with political change. Another explanatory factor is the systematic policies of executive mobility 
applied in certain ministries. A count of the regional directors at the Ministry of Ecology shows that 
to access this position, the average period of time in a post is between 3 and 4 years, and that 
virtually none of these executives remained more than seven years in a position before achieving this 
responsibility (Jeannot, 2010). 
As regards external mobility, it is a fact that periods of more than 10 years in the private sector 
remain an exception, despite a long-standing “revolving door” mechanism in the French civil service. 
Nonetheless, recent work (Rouban, 2002) has shown that the revolving door operated at an earlier 
age, and was permanent, with no return to the public sector. We can therefore assume that our 
population of respondents does not allow us to “see” moves into the private sector. For example, 
35.5% say that they have never worked in the private sector, whereas 32 % have spent less than a 
year there, which can be the duration of an internship. These figures are significantly higher than the 
average results for the COCOPS survey (respectively 27 % and 23 %).Only 27 % say that they have 
spent between 1 and 10 years in the private sector. These figures show that the revolving door is 
confined to an administrative elite drawn from the top branches, which has access to ministerial 
offices, who are probably not part of our survey sample, or else that people who move into the 
private sector do not come back. 
Figure 5. Tenure of respondents 
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4. Values and Attitudes of Public Sector Executives 
 
The role representations with which the respondents identify is interesting. The proposal with which 
the respondents identify the most is “ensuring impartial implementation of laws and rules” (81%), 
which emphasises a traditionally bureaucratic version, in Max Weber’s sense, of the role expected of 
civil servants. However, the results record similar responses for “ensuring impartial implementation 
of laws and rules” and for “ensuring efficient use of resources” (77%).Likewise, identification with the 
idea that the senior civil servants’ role is to provide expertise and technical knowledge (74%) or to 
find joint solutions (70%) is strong but, here again, counterbalanced by the commitment to 
“achieving results” (72%).These findings show that the New Public Management values of efficiency 
can perfectly well coincide with more traditional civil service values, evidence of the presence of 
socialization mechanisms in the NPM or of the influence of financial imperatives. However, when 
individuals are forced to decide between two purportedly contradictory values (Figure 7, question 
23), we find that the principles associated with the traditional bureaucratic state clearly win out over 
market principles, and regulations or the citizen over results or the client. The findings show that the 
prevalence of certain principles associated with the traditional Weberian bureaucratic model – 
equity (42%) vs efficiency (16%); citizen orientation (56%) vs customer focus (10%); state provision 
(54%) vs market provision (7%); funding from taxation (36%) vs funding by users (8%).However, 
unusually and by contrast with the average for the COCOPS survey, the item “achieving results” gets 
quite a high score (27% and even 46% if positions 5, 6 and 7 are totalled), more than “Following 
rules” (20% and 29% if positions 1, 2 and 3 are combined).Similarly, efficiency (27%) is valued more 
highly than quality (22%), seeming to indicate the perceived weight of budgetary constraints and an 
internalization of neo-managerial values. 
 
Figure 6. Identity and self-understanding (Q: I mainly understand my role as public executive as) 
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Figure 7. Priorities as public servants (Q: Public services often need to balance different priorities. Where would you place 
your own position?) 
 
The levels of response on the impact of coordination are lower. In particular, people seem to identify 
the least with “developing new policy agendas” (only 32% identify strongly with this) and “providing 
a voice for societal interests” (24%).The first item corresponds in fact to the division of roles, which 
directors of central government administrations accept more than do the directors of decentralized 
ministerial units, who perform more operational functions of implementation of public policy at the 
regional and départemental level. Remarkably, there is also a fairly high level of response from 
agency directors (29% 6 or 7, 49% 5, 6 or 7), which reveals the perception of a certain autonomy in 
the deciding policy direction. The second item is more likely to reflect a French specificity and a 
distrust of lobbies. The differences between sectors here are significant. The identification with 
“providing a voice for societal interests” is greater in the health or transport sectors, ministries that 
are accustomed to working with the private sector. 
As regards the questions on motivation and social preference (figure 8 and 9), we find a traditional 
attachment to intrinsic motives: attachment to the content of the work (“interesting work”, 92%) or 
to autonomy (“room to make decisions”, 70%) and lower scores for extrinsic motives “job security” 
(41%), “status” (32%) and “high income” (32%).However, the extrinsic motive “doing something that 
is useful for society” is valued (83%), perhaps as an approximation to the ideal of public service, 
similarly, though here to a lesser degree, with “opportunities to help other people” (50% but 78% 
including response level 5).The existence of altruistic motives for public service would seem to be 
partially confirmed here, figures that will be interesting to compare with the remaining results for 
COCOPS. It is also noteworthy that commitment to the public sector is partial with regard to 
opportunities for promotion. 
The results relating to preferences in terms of social values (question 25) are difficult to interpret. At 
first sight, the answers seem fairly conventional. What is needed is a comparison with French 
responses in European surveys on values and, above all, a comparison between countries. 
However, it is interesting to note that, amongst senior executives, women respond significantly more 
favourably to the items “interesting work”, “good opportunities for promotion”, “I like taking 
responsibility for making decisions” and “I make a decision and move on”. This hard-nosed posture is 
very different from the traditional image of “feminine qualities” and is worth emphasizing. One 
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interpretation might be that a woman does not reach this level of responsibility without greater 
determination than men at the same level. 
Figure 8. Motivation (Q: How important do you personally think it is in a job to have) 
 
Figure 9. Social value preferences (Q: Please indicate how far you agree or disagree with the following statements) 
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5. Characteristics of the Work Context in Public Administration 
 
Indicators and targets 
The question on indicators and targets (Q8) has particular implications in France due to the fact that 
one of the major recent components of government reform, the organic bill on finance laws, the so-
called LOLF, is based on the introduction of target-related programmes and budgets underpinned by 
the production of daily numerical targets and measurement indicators. Its implementation began in 
2006. Surveys confirm that the LOLF is being applied and that the neo-managerial instruments have 
been widely rolled out: 46% of the respondents agree with the fact that the goals are clearly stated; 
45% that they are communicated to all staff (only 10% say that this is not the case).The LOLF 
instruments are clearly perceived as day-to-day tools of management. However, the perception of 
indicators is less clear-cut, clearly showing that there is still debate over whether this performance-
based model of government is appropriate to the public sector:53% consider that the number of 
goals is large – which is one of the typical problems of these managerial systems – whereas 22% do 
not think that their activities are easily measurable (44% if we include response position 3) compared 
with 15% who think they are (32% if we add response 5 to responses 6 and 7).These findings give a 
glimpse of the problems that can be associated with the implementation of these performance 
measurement instruments. 
Figure 10. Goal ambiguity (Q: To what extent do the following statements apply to your organization?) 
 
Management Autonomy 
The question on autonomy is particularly appropriate for understanding the work of senior 
executives. It both reveals the continuing weight of traditional administrative rules in the French 
public sector, which generally allows little individual autonomy, and the penetration of neo-
managerial instruments that are supposed to emphasise this autonomy as a principle of good 
management. At the same time, numerous studies have shown that autonomy for administrators 
and managers was often an unfulfilled promise, whereas NPM led to a regain of control (Guillemot, 
Jeannot, 2010, 2013).Taken overall, the results confirm known components of the traditional nature 
of personnel management rules in the French civil service and the highly controlled rules of 
recruitment and promotion.44% of the respondents do not see themselves as autonomous in the 
recruitment of staff.88.5% say that they do not have autonomy when it comes to laying off or sacking 
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staff, but there is more room for manoeuvre with regard to promotion, since only 25% say that they 
are not autonomous (45% if 1, 2 and 3 are included), although training is heavily controlled by the 
joint administrative committees with their union representation and by a branch-based system of 
control. It is noteworthy that 42% of the respondents say that they are not autonomous in the choice 
of public policies (58% including 3), and that only 8.3% say that they are autonomous in this domain. 
With regard to implementation, more respondents (34%) say that they are autonomous (61% if 
response position 5 is added).These results reveal a global perception of lack of autonomy (below the 
COCOPS average), and are in sharp contrast, for example, with the German situation. This arises 
perhaps from the fact that part of the respondents are from ministerial government organizations at 
the regional and départemental levels and are therefore more in a position to implement than 
initiate decisions. We can also see here the influence of politics in the French context, which is 
perhaps perceived by respondents as largely in charge of this decision-making role. 
It is interesting to note that only 17% see themselves as autonomous in budget allocations, which 
confirms that the organic bill on finance laws (LOLF) has not really contributed to significant 
decentralization of budget management. By contrast, 31% see themselves as autonomous with 
regard to reorganization. This result is explained by the fact that the implementation of the general 
public policy review (RGPP) made senior executives – in particular those in the government’s services 
at the regional and départemental levels – responsible for implementing this policy, which largely 
relied on the merging of services. 
Figure 11. Degree of management autonomy (Q: In my position, I have the following degree of autonomy with regard to) 
 
Broadly speaking, senior executives in the French civil service do not see themselves as very 
autonomous. This perhaps reflects the maintenance of strong centralizing and hierarchical 
mechanisms in the French context and confirms worries of scholars about the failure of the 
managerial side of the LOLF e.g. more autonomy for managers.  
The perception of autonomy becomes particularly significant when the variations are analysed on the 
basis of position. A major difference then emerges between the responses by agency directors, who 
see themselves as highly autonomous in all areas, and those by directors of interministerial units at 
the départemental level, who see themselves as having little autonomy except in reorganizations, the 
responsibility for which has in fact been transferred to them. These results suggest a major change in 
French government administration. In the past, numerous studies had highlighted the autonomy of 
directors of ministerial units at the départemental level because of their extensive room for 
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manoeuvre, similar to that of street-level bureaucrats and arising from the influence of local systems 
of regulation between ministerial units at the départemental level, prefects and local politicians. The 
results of the survey clearly show that from one reform to the next, this autonomy has been 
significantly undermined. First, ministerial units at the départemental level have been transformed, 
by the 2007-2010 reforms, into interministerial units, now supervised by the départemental prefects 
and not anymore in a hierarchical line with ministries and their central and regional units. Second 
one might have imagined that this change would benefit the regional directors, whose role was 
greatly reinforced in the regional government reform of 2007-2012, and who are responsible for a 
good proportion of programme budgets in the form of operational programme budgets (BOP).This 
proves to be only partially true: while they are more autonomous than their counterpart at 
départemental level (the directors of interministerial units), they are much less so than agency 
directors. 
Interaction Frequency 
The analysis of interactions is another way of assessing the work of these senior civil servants. The 
levels of at least weekly interaction with hierarchical superiors (98%), staff (99%), functional units 
within the organization such as RH or budget services (95%) or subordinate agencies or bodies within 
the organization (78%), reflect an activity that is highly focused on internal organization. Interactions 
with international bodies outside Europe remain limited (7%) and are confined to the central 
administration and senior civil servants from the grandes écoles. Interactions with European bodies 
are more frequent, with 16% at least monthly, but are present at all territorial levels because of 
structural European funding, which is distributed, in particular, by prefects. Interactions with local 
authorities, private companies and trade unions are slightly less intense, but nevertheless reflect the 
scope of interdependent action: respectively 46%; 52% and 55% say that they have at least monthly 
contact with the three groups. 
Figure 12. Interaction frequency (Q: Please indicate how frequently you typically interact with the following actors or 
bodies) 
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Coordination quality 
In France, the question of coordination between ministries encompasses several factors. First, it 
corresponds to the institutional forms of decision-making between ministries, conducted at national 
level by the government/at interministerial meetings but also, at regional and départemental level, 
conducted on a day-to-day basis by the prefects (within the regional administrative committee) with 
regard to the implementation of public policy (for an overview, Grémion, 1976; Hayward, Wright. 
2002). Secondly, coordination also relates to the partnership between ministries at central level and 
to interministerial coordination, which has been heavily developed in France since the late 1970s, 
through specific public policies, in particular in areas such as rural development, urban policy, 
security or public health policies (Jeannot, Goodchild, 2011). Thirdly, the general public policy review 
culminated in a series of organizational mergers at regional and départemental level (creation of big 
ministerial organizations at regional level, creation of big interministerial entities at départemental 
level) which reinforced the management and coordination role played by the regional echelon within 
ministries and led to more interaction between this level and the central government administrations 
to which it reports. In certain cases, the budgets of the newly created regional divisions depend on 
several ministries, which require coordination. In addition, this reform led to a reinforcement of the 
regional prefects’ coordinating powers. How far do the data from the COCOPS survey enable us to 
identify the factors? 
Figure 13. Coordination quality (Q: How would you characterize collaboration in your own policy field between) 
 
Let us begin by saying that it is a little tricky to relate these diverse factors to the findings that 
emerge from the survey. Nonetheless, the first observation that emerges is a fairly positive picture of 
coordination in a single public policy sector (39% corresponding to type 5, 6 and 7 responses) and, by 
contrast, significantly poorer between different ministerial and policy sectors (only 23% see it as 
largely good, 63% as largely poor).These negative assessments of interministerial coordination seem 
to indicate that it works badly, and that French government operate largely in compartments. 
Supporting this latter interpretation, it is noteworthy that the question, specific to the French survey, 
on the coordination between levels within the ministry, reveals a mostly positive evaluation, since 
almost 53% of the respondents (of those who did not refuse to state an opinion on this question) find 
this intra-ministerial coordination to be broadly good. This may be a sign that the vertical integration 
of ministries is effective, whereas coordination between ministries is less so. It is also possible to 
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conclude that the levels of positive appraisal remain essentially modest, implying that coordination 
overall is not perceived as entirely satisfactory. 
If we analyse the assessments of external coordination, it is striking to note that the coordination 
with national and supranational levels is perceived as essentially poor by a majority of respondents 
(58%), while the view of relations with local authorities is a little less negative (largely poor for 
44%).The least clear-cut result corresponds to relations with private companies and the voluntary 
sector, perceived by 42% as largely good. 
These findings indicate that it is the relationship between levels within a single ministry that is seen 
as most important. Overall, we find a generally unfavourable picture of the existing forms of 
coordination. This is supported by the fact that, as in Germany, a significantly smaller number of 
people answered this question, with a number of respondents saying that they were unable to 
evaluate the issues. This rate of non-response may support the idea that public service executives are 
unfamiliar with the activities of other organizations, which implies a lack of coordination. 
Degree of politicization 
The responses relating to relations with politicians are difficult to interpret and somewhat 
contradictory. To start with, it can be said that the French administration is characterised by the 
presence of mechanisms of politicization for the upper echelons (political appointments within the 
council of ministers for directors of central government administrations plus the existence of 
ministerial cabinets) but by less politicization in the lower echelons. However, political intervention 
can occur at regional government level, in particular because the prefects intervene politically in the 
ordinary operations of decentralized ministerial units at regional and départemental levels by  
channelling political demands, whether from local politicians (to negotiate local deals) or from the 
executive (e.g. strong pressures on employment policies or strong pressures in the event of crises, 
particularly health-related).The likelihood of perceiving political interference therefore varies 
markedly from one level and one position to another. 
Figure 14. Degree of politization (Q: What is your view on the following statements) 
 
Supporting the idea of distance from politics, 64% of the respondents believe that politicians do not 
interfere in day-to-day activities. Similarly, 52% broadly disagree with the idea that senior civil 
servants are at the heart of public policy development (thereby acknowledging, even implicitly, the 
predominance of political roles), whereas 57% broadly agree with the idea that politicians respect 
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the technical expertise of the civil service. These results should be interpreted as a stable recognition 
of the division of roles (politicians decide, civil servants execute), which correspond both to the 
Weberian ideal of the bureaucracy and to the French situation of the 2nd and 3rd level echelons of 
the organization, which are effectively sheltered from political interference. From these perspectives, 
France’s senior administrative levels seem to perceive the spheres as relatively autonomous, both in 
terms of experience and aspiration. However, two items produce different responses, which blur the 
reading and reveal a certain tension in the relations between politics and the administration. Thus, 
46% broadly agree with the politically incorrect proposal that “Removing issues and activities from 
the realms of politics allows for more farsighted policies” (vs 38% who broadly disagree).This figure 
seems quite high, and would seem to show that almost half of senior civil servants would like to see 
politicians keep their distance, in order to give the administrative players more freedom in the 
conduct of public policy. These respondents therefore feel implicitly that politics have too much 
influence. However, the way the questions are formulated does not tell us whether they relate to the 
minister, members of the national parliament or local politicians, an important question in the 
French context. Likewise, the answers to the question “Politicians regularly influence senior-level 
appointments in my organization” are very sharply divided: 45% broadly disagree with this 
statement, and the same percentage broadly agrees. It seems reasonable to assume that this 
perception varies between levels and positions. In fact, central administration executives (including 
deputy directors) and prefects more clearly feel the weight of political interference in appointments 
than do regional and départemental directors. These variable responses on the influence of 
politicians correspond to the legal distinction between senior civil servants appointed by the council 
of ministers and the others. 
In international comparison, however, it would seem that slightly fewer than average French 
respondents (46% vs 55%) agree with the proposition that “Removing issues and activities from the 
realms of politics produces better policies”.  
 Generally speaking, senior French civil servants would seem to be highly exposed to performance-
related government instruments and the problems they generate (large number of targets, 
difficulties of measurement).They also see deficiencies in coordination but suffer, in particular, from 
an overall lack of autonomy. In the French context, therefore, neo-managerial instruments would 
seem more to have revived centralization practices than to have created autonomy. Conversely, 
given the historical autonomy enjoyed by regional government in France, the responses to the 
questionnaire seem to indicate that central government has “re-established control” over regional 
government services. 
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6. Relevance of NPM and post NPM Reforms 
6.1. Policy field level 
 
The contents of administrative reform policies can vary considerably from one country to another 
(and also from one period to another), with certain governments preferring certain measures to 
others. As regards the big reform trends identified by the respondents in France (question 17, fig. 
15), it is no surprise to find that the main reforms were conducted under the general public policy 
review (RGPP) during President Sarkozy’s mandate. The responses therefore describe the reforms of 
the last five years, and reflect the sedimentary layers of previous reforms, which are perceived as less 
dominant and at work because a bit older. 
86% of respondents identify the impact of the “Public Sector Downsizing” measures: they correspond 
to the sustained policy of cutting public sector employment over this period by the non-replacement 
of one in two retiring civil servants. The second item particularly identified was the policy of 
organizational merger (69%), which actually corresponds to the multiple reorganizations associated 
with the RGPP: mergers of central government administrations, of ministerial divisions at the 
regional level and of interministerial divisions at the départemental level. Associated with this, 
though to a less significant degree, is the presence of reforms focusing on collaboration and 
cooperation between different players. In fact, reform of ministerial units at regional level was 
marked by the desire to merge organizations in order to increase cooperation between them, and by 
the strengthening of the prefects’ coordinating powers. So these priorities are clearly identified. 
These measures, clearly dominated by the downsizing theme, which has the biggest psychological 
impact and affects organizations in their operation, are nevertheless not equated with privatization: 
this is evidenced by the mere 9% of responses on the question of “privatization” and, to a lesser 
degree, for “flexible employment” and “contracting out”, respectively 24% and 27%The reforms 
relating to performance targets and linked with the LOLF, first implemented in 2006 before the 
Sarkozy era, take a back seat. The respondents underline the importance of focusing on outcomes 
and results as broadly high at 54%, giving it the same degree of resonance as another managerial 
orientation, treating service users as customers (47%).To a significant extent, 59% of the senior 
executives also identify the progress of digital government (or e-government) as broadly important, 
but also the creation of autonomous agencies (in France, taking the form of a growth in public 
establishments), which 40% of them see as broadly important. Identified as a markedly less 
important background issue, are two components of administrative reform: transparency, open 
government and citizen participation, which 27% seen as largely present and, as we have said, 
market type reforms (flexible employment, contracting out and external partnerships). 
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Figure 15. Importance of reform trends (Q: How important are the following reform trends in your policy area?) 
 
Generally speaking, the respondents’ perceptions and responses provide a fairly accurate map of 
actual reforms in France. Differences in attitudes to certain trends may reflect the fact that the 
reforms are (relatively) older, or that they develop gradually and discreetly, in other words without 
major political emphasis. Variations in the way the reforms affect government in France at different 
levels are also instructive, but no surprise. Decentralized ministerial units at the regional level and 
decentralized, now interministerial, units at the départemental level place greater emphasis than the 
other groups on mergers and downsizing, which have affected them very markedly, whereas agency 
directors identify the impact of corporatization but also, because these practices are probably more 
widespread in public establishments, contracting out and public-private partnerships. 
In conclusion, and to situate France internationally, we can see a link between the NPM priorities 
(downsizing; previously, the focus on results; discreet forms of agency creation), drastic 
reorganizations through merger bringing cooperation issues to the heart of the reform process, and 
measures based on the development of digital government. Reforms of a different kind 
(transparency, citizen participation) attract little attention, because they were not much represented 
in the Sarkozy era reforms. The limitation of this map is that it provides a picture of the most recent 
reforms, not an overview of what has become historically embedded. 
Figure 16 looks at senior executives’ overall perceptions of administrative reforms. These assessments 
clearly relate to the recent reforms introduced under the general public policy review. All in all, the 
assessments are uniform and broadly consider (scale 1-3) that the reforms are top-down (84%), 
substantial (i.e. drastic and very visible, 57%), little concerned with negotiation (contested by the 
unions 73%) and very much about cost-cutting and savings (68% versus 9.5% who consider them – 
scale 8-10 – to be driven by quality improvement).The pushiness of the recent reforms is emphasised 
in several responses.35% of respondents see them as largely driven by politics (compared with 24% as 
driven by the administration, though this ultimately unclear figure might be explained either by the 
role played by top-flight civil servants in drawing up the reforms, or by the fact that the senior 
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executives were broadly involved in implementing and developing them locally).They are seen as 
“driven by the crisis” by 41% of respondents (compared with planned for only 19.3%).Finally, they are 
seen as “independent of public opinion” by 48% of respondents, compared with 11.5% who see them 
as driven by public opinion. 
Figure 16. Dynamics of public sector reform (Q: Public sector reforms in my policy area tend to be) 
 
The assessments of their effects are cagey, with 20.18% seeing them as a failure, whereas 16.7% 
consider them an overall success. The perception of the reforms as excessively intensive can be 
appreciated by the fact that 45.03% of respondents thought that there were too many, whereas only 
8% thought there were not enough. 
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6.2. Organizational level 
The perception of management instruments (Figure 17) is particularly important. Beyond the 
perception of the major reform trends (see above), the assessment by senior civil servants of the 
instruments actually used in their parent organization is a good indicator of the changes underway in 
public administration. In France, because the term New Public Management is used sparingly in 
speeches on reform so as not to upset public opinion or civil servants, reform often involves the 
introduction of management instruments, which are assumed to be more neutral, and above all 
more discreet. Three instruments are seen by most respondents as being very significant in the 
French context: staff performance interviews (89.2% on scale 5, 6 and 7), management by objectives 
and results (72.9%) and business planning (59.7%).We see clearly here the stamp of management 
methods based on the previous reforms (LOLF) and the measures taken during the Sarkozy 
presidency, which extended the individual performance interview to the detriment of scoring 
mechanisms. Another important component (55.8%) is the codes of conduct, which are often 
associated with the framework of public contracts. 
Figure 17. Relevance of different management instruments (Q: To what extent are the following instruments used in 
your organization?) 
 
Some relatively precise instruments generate very disparate views, with a balance between 
the percentage who perceive them as widespread and those who do not think they are present: 
these include quality management systems, one-stop shops, internal steering, benchmarking and risk 
management. These very different perceptions are probably explained by the fact that the 
application of these instruments varies widely between ministries. We therefore find, as in the 
previous survey (Jeannot, Guillemot, 2010), that management tools (indicators, target-based 
management) but also service-oriented instruments (one-stop shops, quality, user surveys) have 
developed particularly in the Ministry of Finance and less in the social ministries or National 
Education. The Ecology and Health Ministries are somewhere in between. 
However, a large number of instruments that come out of the New Public Management 
doctrinal toolbox are nevertheless largely seen as not being widespread: examples are cost 
accounting systems (56.5% see them as broadly absent), the decentralization of financial decisions 
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and staffing decisions (respectively 53% and 65% not present), performance-related pay (57.4%) and 
user satisfaction surveys (54%). 
If we look only at personnel management issues, we find that staff appraisal interviews are in 
place virtually everywhere, but conversely that the highly controversial mechanism of performance-
related pay is very little used (only 26% see it as widespread) – this result is all the more interesting in 
that the COCOPS survey targets senior executives, who have been the leading beneficiaries of this 
system in France since 2006 and, even more, beneficiaries of the decentralization of personnel 
management. 
If we look more closely at the uses of performance-related management instruments in the 
organization (Figure 18, question 8), the first thing we see is that a majority of respondents do not 
see them as linked with mechanisms of punishment/discipline. The small number of respondents 
(scale 1-2 and 6-7) who perceive a clear reward (8%) or penalty (6%) for achieving objectives shows 
that, while systems of management by results are indeed in place, their impact is limited and they 
are not much used as disciplinary instruments. The use of indicators by politicians for monitoring 
purposes is seen as widespread by a slight majority of respondents, 45% compared with 38.9% on a 
scale of 3, which would seem to suggest that practices differ from one level to another. The 
questions on the measurement of input/process and outputs/outcomes were supposed to 
distinguish two ways of designing performance measurement: focused on means or focused on 
results and achievements. From this perspective, the results are very even, since the proportion of 
those who say that these types of measures are widespread is balanced by those who say that they 
are not. 
The responses seem rather to distinguish between those who say that they do measure 
(input and output) and those who say that they don’t. We find partly the same results for the 
question on the use of indicators: the dominant factor is less the variation in use of the indicator, 
than whether or not the indicator is used at all. 
Figure 18. Relevance of performance management (Q: To what extent do the following statements apply to your 
organization?) 
 
A final question relates to issues of coordination and the types of instruments or practices developed 
by senior executives to resolve problems of this kind when they arise. The question is particularly 
acute in the case of France in so far as the analyses in Part 5 on the quality of coordination clearly 
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show the force of vertical, compartmentalized operation and fragmentation between ministries. The 
responses to question 13 show the power of hierarchical mechanisms. Indeed, 85% of respondents 
(scale 3) state that in the event of conflict between organizations, the usual solution chosen is to 
refer the problem upwards. This approach is by far the most dominant. Next comes the 
establishment of an ad hoc project group (50% of respondents) and then the decision to shift the 
problem to the political level (41%) All the other approaches are seen as infrequent and the results 
show the difficulty of making interministeriality work as a process or, at the other extreme, of 
prioritizing one ministry over another. Hence, the solution of “deciding on one lead organization” is 
seen a little used option by 57.5% of respondents. In addition, participation or project-based 
approaches are judged by the majority as rare: 61% of the respondents feel that special-purpose 
bodies are rarely set up; 69% say the same about consultation with civil society bodies or interest 
groups; 58% about consultation of experts. 51% also consider that partnership-based or 
interministerial public policies are infrequent, compared with 26% who believe the practice to be 
widespread.  
Figure 19. Coordination solutions (Q: To resolve coordination problems when working with other organizations, we 
typically) 
 
  
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100
%
Refer the issue upwards in the hierarchy
Refer the issue to political actors and bodies
Set up special purpose bodies (more permanent)
Set up a cross-cutting work/project group (ad hoc,
temporary)
Set up a cross-cutting policy arrangement or programme
Decide on one lead organisation
Consult civil  society organisations or interest groups 
Consult relevant experts (e.g. scientists or consultants)
Strongly disagree … … … … … Strongly agree
COCOPS Work Package 3, Country Report France – May 2013  Page 36 
6.3. Individual level 
If we now consider the question on the individual use of indicators in day-to-day work (Figure 
20, question 9), we observe two majority uses focusing on the internal day-to-day operations of the 
organization and on the individual activities of the staff concerned: 58.5% say they use them largely 
to know whether they have reached their targets and 61% to identify problems that require 
attention. However, only 45% of respondents (vs 35%) say that they use them to foster learning and 
improvement. These results would seem to show that indicators are used more as “warning signals” 
than as operational methods of improving performance. 
Figure 20. Use of performance indicators (Q: In my work I use performance indicators to) 
 
By contrast, external uses seem to be markedly less valued: only 37% say that they use 
indicators to manage their organization’s image; 30.9% to communicate with citizens; 23.6% to 
engage with external stakeholders. 
Indicators are also used to regulate collective performance within the organization – new 
forms of social control – though the responses are less unanimous: hence 53% (vs 29%) say that they 
use them to satisfy the requirements of their line managers, which highlights the disciplinary aspect 
of indicators, whereas conversely, 47% of respondents (vs 35%) say that they use indicators to 
monitor the performance of their colleagues. 
 
 
  
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100
%
Assess whether I reach my targets
Monitor the performance of my colleagues
Identify problems that need attention
Foster learning and improvement
Satisfy requirements of my line manager
Communicate what my organisation does to citizens
and service users
Engage with external stakeholders (e.g. interest
groups)
Manage the image of my organisation 
Not at all … … … … … To a large extent
COCOPS Work Package 3, Country Report France – May 2013  Page 37 
7. Impact of the Fiscal Crisis on Public Administration 
 
In France, the economic crisis appeared in the context of significantly deteriorated public 
finances since forty years8. The “great petrification” (Siné, 2006) corresponds to the progressive 
diminution of the room for maneuver of the State over its finances due to the continuous 
accumulation of debt initiated in 1974. The debt outstanding was multiplied by 18 between 1978 and 
2007, while its share in GDP went from 21% in 1978 to 40% in 1992, to reach 64% in December 
2007.9 One of the consequences was the increasing share of debt service in the national budget. In 
2012, the costliest program the State must finance is the debt service (49 billion Euros), right after 
primary and secondary education (62.3 billion Euros) and the transfers to local governments (100 
billion Euros).From 2008, the deficit rapidly deepened to go beyond the threshold that is authorized 
by the Maastricht treaty and reached 7.5% of GDP in 2009. It decreased painfully to 5.2% in 2011. 
The crisis put an end to the country’s ability to contain the augmentation of public debt after 
stabilization over the 2004-2007 period (64% of GPD) that could at least partly be explained by 
creative accounting10. Indeed, the public debt rose each year from 3 to 11 points from 2008 to 2011. 
It was 86% of GDP in 2011 and peaked at 89.3% in March 2012, that is to say 1 789.4 billion Euros. 
The most remarkable year is definitely 2009, since the stimulus plan of 26 billion Euros, combined 
with a reduction of fiscal resources, was accompanied by a negative peak for the public deficit (67 
billion Euros, 7.5% of GDP) increased by four percentage points compared with the previous year and 
an eleven points increase concerning the public debt. In a word, the public debt increased by 22 GDP 
points over the period considered (2007-2011), that is to say an increase five times higher than the 
one during the last fifteen years11.  Less involved in real estate and bank crises, France has, similar to 
Germany and Italy, less suffered from the financial and banking crisis than other countries in the 
European Union. 
In 2007, the new government and President Sarkozy were particularly aware of the 
budgetary difficulties to the extent that N. Sarkozy had been Minister of Economics and Finances 
when the change in budgetary referential was launched. He had also been part of the team who set 
the sustainability of public finances on the agenda. N. Sarkozy had notably signed the mission letter 
for Camdessus’ committee and report in 2004, in which he asked for an analysis in order to answer 
the limits of the French growth model. Then, as the head of the State, he strongly relied on many top 
officials from the financial spheres, all rather sensitive to public deficit and debt issues.Within this 
perspective, the General Review of Public Policies and its reviews, launched in 2007 before the crisis, 
were supposed to constitute an unprecedented cutback management exercise, in line with the 
recent managerial evolutions brought by the LOLF. 
Paradoxically, the reaction to crisis took two consecutive steps: (i) a recovery plan between 
2009 and 2010 (26 billion Euros additional spending over 2 years), associated to several cutback 
measures that were not directly linked to the crisis, and (ii) from 2010, the launching of most cutback 
measures which had not been planned by the government before.  
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 This sum-up is extracted from Albert, Bezes and Le Lidec 2013, COCOPS WP7, short report.   
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 Chamsaur-Cotis, Rapport sur la situation des finances publiques, May 2010 
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 Order n°2004-559 of June, 6th 2004 on Public private partnership contracts 
11
 Chamsaur-Cotis, Rapport sur la situation des finances publiques, May 2010 
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The pension reform belongs to these cutback measures that were planned before the crisis’ 
arrival and taken to address a signal to financial markets. The pension reform targeted civil servants 
since the new laws lead to a progressive convergence of their contribution share with the private 
sector. In concrete terms, this corresponds to an augmentation from 7.85 % to 10.55 %, spread over 
the next ten years, without any wage compensations.It brought civil servants into line with the less 
favourable conditions in the private sector. More recently, the terms for sickness pay were brought 
more into line with those done in the private sector.  
 Rather than laying off personnel or slowing down promotions, hiring freeze has been applied 
to public administration from 2007 through the replacement of only one out of two retiring state 
employees as part of the RGPP. 150 000 jobs were thus suppressed within State services between 
2008 and 201212 and 84 000 between 2008 and 2010. According to the government in place, this 
would represent 800 million Euros of savings each year for the State. Within the State civil service13, 
posts in ministries were downsized by 3.7% between 2005 and 2010, going from 2 154 000 jobs 
(2007) to 1 888 000 (2010), while national établissements publics went up by 12.9% over the same 
period.The last austerity measure was a pay measure introduced by Nicolas Sarkozy’s government: 
the aim was to stop the indexing of the point value on the retail price index. Point value grew by 
2.8% over the period 2008-2011, at a time when inflation was 4.4%, bringing a real terms salary cut 
of 1.6%. This measure was partially offset by other initiatives.  
The way that senior executives perceive the measures taken to respond to the crisis reflects 
the relative moderation and hybrid character of these measures. Indeed, perceptions are all the 
more difficult to assess in that the respondents equate the recovery measures taken in response to 
the crisis with the austerity policies introduced in 2007 under the general public policy review 
process. These ambiguities re-emerge in the questionnaire.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12 IGA, IGF, IGAS, Rapport « Bilan de la RGPP et conditions de réussited’une nouvelle politique de réforme de l’Etat », 
Septembre 2012. 
13 Ministère de la Fonction publique, Rapport annuel sur l’état de la fonction publique (édition 2012) 
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Figure 21. Overall saving strategy (Q: In response to the fiscal crisis how would you describe the broader approach to 
realizing savings in your policy area?) 
 
Question 20 (Figure 21) gives somewhat unreliable results or rather results that seem to 
suggest that all the spending reduction measures were implemented simultaneously. 33% see the 
cuts as having been proportional across the board; 33.5% as targeted according to priorities; 30% as 
focusing on productivity gains. The respondents do not place the three approaches in any order of 
precedence.  
Figure 22 and Question 21 give more detailed results on the measures observed by the 
respondents. They see the first measure taken to reduce public spending as hiring freezes (83% on 
the scale 5, 6 and 7), reflecting the policy – introduced in 2007 – of not replacing one in every two 
retiring civil servants. This measure has been at the heart of the cutbacks policy conducted over the 
last five years and began in 2002. Significantly, the second measure seeing as most frequently used is 
the downsizing of back offices (69% on a three point scale), an approach also specified in the RGPP, 
which explicitly employed amalgamations to pool back-office functions. It is interesting here to note 
that there is more of an emphasis on the cutback in back offices than on a reduction in front office 
functions (42%), which reflects the fact that, in the reorganization of the regional administration, the 
various existing front-office functions were retained within larger entities, while back-office 
administrative functions were reduced. Next, two measures relating to public policy itself, are largely 
seen to be present, though to a lesser degree: cuts to existing programmes (61%, scale of three) and 
postponement or abandonment of new programmes (59%). The perception that public action itself is 
affected is therefore fairly widespread.  After this, come pay freezes (51%), which are not placed at 
the top of the agenda but, here, reflect the decision not to increase the value of the civil service 
index point, regardless of the rate of inflation. 
On the other hand, a number of measures are seen as absent from the governmental 
agenda: one is staff layoffs (a measure impossible in the French career public service) or significant 
pay cuts, which have taken place in other southern European countries, but are here perceived by 
92% of respondents as little used (scale 3). The same is true for increases in user fees and charges.  
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COCOPS Work Package 3, Country Report France – May 2013  Page 40 
Figure 22. Cutback measures at organizational level (Q: In response to the fiscal crisis, to what extent has your 
organization applied the following cutback measures?) 
 
Question 22 on the effects of the budget crisis on the division of powers in government also 
provides instructive results. The respondents describe forms of recentralization: thus 74% of 
respondents consider that the powers of the Ministry of Finance have increased and 66% that 
decision-making is more centralized in their parent organization (scale 3); similarly, 68.5% perceive 
the relevance of performance indicators to have increased, whereas 55% judge that the budget 
planning units in their own organization have gained more power. Unsurprisingly, budget constraints 
seem to be embodied in a process of recentralization and in an increase in oversight linked with the 
emphasis on financial issues. However, two results cast a more complex light on the dynamics at 
work. First, it is noteworthy that only 35% of the respondents consider that the power of politicians 
in the decision-making processes has increased (vs. 39% who think the contrary, scale 3). This result 
is not easy to interpret. One possibility is that the respondents wish to emphasize the still powerful 
position of senior civil servants in a French administrative system that gives them an important role 
in the decision-making process, or that they are implicitly criticizing the fact that politicians are not 
more involved in taking decisions on austerity that they know to be unpopular. The second 
interesting fact is that the development of austerity measures is seen as being only moderately 
reflected – with 42% of respondents saying yes and 34% saying no – in increased conflict between 
directorates within their parent organizations. This ambiguous result might seem to suggest that the 
prioritization of public policies has actually been modest.  
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8. Impact of Public Administration Reform 
8.1 Overall 
 The general view of the performance of public administration (question 16 and figure 23) is 
broadly balanced, with a slight negative bias. If we take a scale of 2 (1 and 2 vs. 9 and 10), the 
negative opinions on civil service performance markedly outweigh the positive: 14% (1+2) vs. 6% 
(9+10). If we take a scale of 3, the negative views are still predominant: 28.9% broadly worse vs. 
18.4% broadly better. Almost 30% of the respondents thus perceive a decline in the efficiency of the 
administration in 2022 compared with 2007. However, a large proportion – 53% of respondents – 
report median views (4 to 7), which can be taken to mean that the situation is pretty much the same. 
Generally speaking, all the judgments vary according to the respondent’s level of responsibility, 
becoming more critical the further down the hierarchy we go. If we confine ourselves to the first and 
second levels of responsibility, the appraisal curve is virtually symmetrical.  
Figure 23. Overall PA assessment (Q: Compared with five years ago, how would you say things have developed when it 
comes to the way public administration runs in your country?) 
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8.2 Policy Field 
This essentially balanced view obviously applies a very broad brush. It does not preclude 
sharp variations according to where the changes strike and the performance associated with the 
reforms, which are assessed in Question 19 (Figure 24).  
The two most favorable assessments, indicating an improvement, are few and relate to costs 
(58% on scale 3) and innovation (46% as against 28%). This suggests a fairly restricted view of the 
improvements, since the first item reflects the numerous initiatives in the RGPP designed to cut 
spending, and the second refers to technological changes (e-government, Internet). The perception 
of efficiency improvements is consistent with the overall view on the direction of reforms cited 
above. After this, only ethical behavior among public officials is judged to have improved (37% 
against 20%), a result that is not necessarily easy to interpret.  
Figure 24. Different performance dimensions (Q: Thinking about your policy area over the last five years how would you 
rate the way public administration has performed on the following dimensions?) 
 
By contrast, a large number of areas are perceived as having clearly declined. Certain 
perceptions of decline relate to the “external” effects arising from administrative action: the most 
remarkable (and the most worrying?) results in this sphere are that the senior executives surveyed 
consider that social cohesion has deteriorated (57% vs. 12%) along with citizen trust in government 
(60% vs. 9.5% on a scale of 3).  To a lesser degree, 47% of the respondents (vs. 22%) consider that 
citizen participation is also falling. The other clear perceptions of deterioration relate to the 
“internal” negative perception of the public sector and of the morale of its staff: 61% of respondents 
(vs. 17%) thus believe that staff motivation has deteriorated and 56% (vs. 21%) that the 
attractiveness of the public sector (i.e. of the government) as an employer has diminished. Similarly, 
47% (vs. 29%) feel that the situation has deteriorated with respect to paperwork and red tape, which 
could reflect certain rigidities associated with the LOLF and the bureaucratization generated by 
government by performance. These results indicate a certain malaise amongst senior executives and 
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the sense of a government that is enfeebled and out of touch. It seems a long time since 
administrative reform measures place the emphasis on participation by civil servants and users 
(Rocard reform of 1989, cf. Bezes, 2009). The critique of the external effects is matched here by a 
critique of internal operations.  
On the other issues – quality of service, effectiveness of public policy, consistency and 
coordination of policies, transparency and openness, equality of access to public services, equitable 
treatment of citizens – there is a balance of views.  
Some of these results vary significantly from one sector to another. Views are broadly more 
optimistic for executives in the economic and financial sectors. This is particularly true of quality of 
service. The importance attributed to participation as a commitment or an effect is slightly greater in 
the environment and health sectors. Again in the health sector, the view that staff motivation has 
declined is even more marked than elsewhere.  
Figure 25. Social capital and trust (Q: People in my organization) 
 
The questions on social capital and trust (Q14, figure 25) are more difficult to interpret, 
because they do not support the fairly negative assessments of staff motivation and the 
attractiveness of government service analyzed above. The responses are largely positive, with few 
sharp differences, possibly a little conformist and uniform in their conclusions. However, there is a 
difference between the items that generate more unanimity, relating to interpersonal relations and 
trust in staff, and the items that arouse more balanced responses which, for their part, relate to the 
collective aspect of the organization. Thus, 71% of the respondents feel that staff engages in open 
and honest communication with one another, and 77% that they are trustworthy. These responses, 
coming from senior executives, would seem to be consistent with their role (one would not expect a 
senior executive to question the quality of his or her staff). By contrast, a series of questions on the 
collective aspect of the organization gives positive but less unanimous results: thus, the idea that 
staff view themselves as partners in charting the direction of the organization; the idea that they 
enthusiastically pursue collective goals and missions; or the feeling that they share the same 
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ambitions and vision for the organization (respectively, 41% agree vs. 36%; 47% vs. 28%; 50% vs. 
25%) on a scale of 3.  
 
8.3 Individual Level 
The questions on workplace satisfaction (Q15, figure 26) also draw broadly positive responses, which 
need to be carefully interpreted in the light of the social and administrative group concerned: senior 
executives whose important jobs and high status understandably generate positive views. Thus, 
80.5% find their work satisfying, 75% feel valued for their work, and 67% would recommend their 
organization as a good place to work (scale 3). More than the other countries in the COCOPS survey, 
however, 54% of the respondents in the French survey find that they are regularly overloaded or 
unable to cope. 
Figure 26. Job satisfaction (Q: When thinking about my work and the organization I work for) 
 
Figure 27. Organizational commitment (Q: When thinking about my work and the organization I work for) 
 
 The questions on organizational commitment (figure 27) give less clear-cut results (scale 3). 
On the one hand, the responses seem to indicate a strong commitment to the organization, 
based on learned values – 70% say that they were taught to believe in the value of remaining 
loyal to one organization – or associated with the work – 69% state that they feel that the 
organization’s problems are their own. On the other hand, only 48% (vs. 35%) say that they 
would be happy to spend the rest of their careers in their organization and 41% (vs. 42%) that it 
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would be hard for them to leave their organization, even if they wanted. Senior executives do 
not seem to develop a very strong emotional commitment to their parent organization. 
Moreover, 79% of the respondents do not agree with the idea that “Things were better in the 
days when people stayed with one organization for most of their career”, suggesting that they 
value the idea of a certain degree of mobility. These figures need to be seen in the light of 
differences between ministries, with very variable salary and compensation conditions.  
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9. Findings from the Health and Employment sector 
 
9.1 Characteristics of the health sector 
The health sector as represented in the sample is – unlike the employment sector – relatively 
homogeneous from an institutional perspective: it is still a ministerial administration headed by the 
minister responsible for health. However, it is particularly interesting in so far as it is the sector 
where New Public Management instruments – profit centres, performance indicators, the agency 
model –have been most markedly adopted and implemented. 
Three components of this sector can be distinguished within the sample.  
The first is the central administration of the Ministry of Health. Reflecting ministerial reshuffles and 
changing ministerial portfolios, this administration can be linked with other themes. At the time of 
the survey, in 2012, health was part of a big Ministry of Labor, Employment and Health. The purpose 
of these ministerial groupings is more political than administrative. While ministerial portfolios may 
change, the big directorates that constitute health policy are, for their part, stable and relatively 
immune to such reshuffles. For example, there is the central directorate of health, the central 
directorate of healthcare or, indeed, the directorate of social security.  
The second component consists of a set of national “agencies” which, in France, have the status of 
public establishments: the French Blood Establishment, the National Agency for the Safety of 
Medicines and Health Products (ANSM), created by the Act of 29 December 2011, which replaced the 
French Agency for the Safety of Health Products (Afssaps), the Biomedicine Agency, the Health 
Monitoring Institute, etc. These public establishments, legal entities that are the equivalent of 
agencies, were set up with the aim of establishing independent oversight through autonomous 
bodies. Some – like the agency responsible for blood, following the 1980s contaminated blood 
scandal, or the French agency for the safety of health products, with the very recent Médiator 
scandal – have been heavily criticized and found themselves the focus of considerable controversy.  
The third, and numerically the most significant component, are the regional health agencies (ARS), 
present in France’s 22 regions and with local delegations in the country’s departments (Bezes, Pierru, 
2012; Pierru, Rolland, 2013). From an international perspective, the term “agency” needs to be 
treated with care. These Regional Health Agencies (agence régionale de santé, ARS) were created by 
the 2009 Hospital, Patients, Health and Territories Act. They are the Health ministerial units at the 
regional level but a bit more than that (see below). The ARS are responsible for ensuring that 
healthcare provision meets the needs of the population by improving coordination between the 
services provided by outpatient and hospital sectors, and by the health and social care sector, while 
meeting national health spending targets. The agency is an “Etablissement public” (public 
establishment) which encompasses a range of regional stakeholder organizations. Nevertheless, ARS 
reports directly to the Directorate of Health and Social Affairs and to the Prefects. The reason for 
setting up the ARS is therefore different from the reason for creating national agencies. To 
understand it, we will briefly describe the process that led to it. In 1997, the Regional Hospitalization 
Agencies were created to regulate the hospital sector. The model at the time was the agencies 
responsible for regulating public services such as electricity or telecommunications. The theory 
behind it was that a body independent of the administration was better placed to organize the 
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operating rules of the hospital sector with an economic dimension. In practical terms, the big public 
hospitals are the responsibility of the mayors of the cities where they are located. In medium-sized 
cities, these hospitals are often the principal local employer and therefore of crucial importance to 
the municipality. Prefects, who previously represented central government on hospital boards, were 
not specialists on health issues (even if they were supported by the decentralized services of the 
Ministry of Health) and could be tempted to use the local hospital as a bargaining chip in their 
relations with city mayors. The regional hospitalization agencies were therefore created to make the 
regulation of these hospitals more technical and more independent. These agencies were therefore 
“public interest groups” whose role it was to coordinate government and health insurance services to 
improve regulation in the hospital sector. 
The thinking behind the creation of the ARS (regional health agencies) in 2009 was significantly 
different. As we have said, they have the status of French government public administrative 
establishments responsible for implementing health policy at regional level. Created on 1 April 2010 
(ref. Act N009-879 of 21 July 2009 on “Hôpital, patients, santé et territoire“ (HPST – hospital, 
patients, health and regions), their purpose was to “provide unified management of health in the 
regions, to respond more effectively to the needs of the population and to increase the efficiency of 
the system”. In concrete terms, one of the roles of the ARS is to rationalize health provision, in other 
words city, hospital and medical and social healthcare spending, as well as being responsible for 
public health and health monitoring policy. In so doing, the ARS have replaced other institutions and 
taken over all or some of their powers: the decentralized units of the Ministry of Health which were 
the units of health and social affairs at the regional level (DRASS) and the units of health and social 
affairs at the départemental level (DDASS). They have taken over the activities of the regional public 
health groups and the regional health delegations. And finally, they have replaced certain social 
security bodies, namely the regional health insurance fund unions, the staff of the OSS (Healthcare 
System Organization) centres, the preventative function of the Medical Monitoring Service and the 
health branch of the regional health insurance funds (CRAM). The creation of the ARS therefore 
shifted all the decentralized health divisions (by separating them from social security functions) into 
this “agency” structure and merged them with divisions from Social Security, financed from the 
independent sources of the Social Security bodies, which have long had a status and mode of 
operation close to that of the private sector. The ARS are therefore a kind of “hybrid”, halfway 
between the model of a regulatory agency and a traditional decentralized administration, even 
though in practice they tend to operate more like the latter. Two aspects of this are revealing. Firstly, 
they are subject to little prefectural oversight (in the tradition of regulatory agencies), much less than 
the other decentralized services; and secondly, their operating methods are marked by private sector 
approaches (based on the model of the social security structures). However, it should not be 
forgotten that almost 80% of the staff of these ARS were civil servants in decentralized 
administrative units: they now work alongside staff from social security, who are covered by the 
collective Health-Insurance agreement. These “agencies” must therefore be interpreted with 
caution. The agency form in France has been used by the government to merge the Health-Insurance 
organizations with government ministerial directorates… but the government imposes a mode of 
operation close to that of a big decentralized administration. In other words, the agency is a format 
that sounds “modern”, while being used as a way to amalgamate organizations with different 
statuses.  
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For this reason and in different ways, this sector represents an excellent illustration of how the 
agency model has been used to reform State administration.  
 
9.2 The employment sector 
The employment sector, as represented in the sample, is not a homogeneous entity. In addition, the 
response rates vary widely from one component to another. Once again, therefore, the data on this 
sector should be treated with caution.  
Until 2008, the public employment service was divided between numerous bodies with a wide range 
of statuses: these include the ANPE (National employment agency) responsible for placing 
jobseekers; Unédic (national interprofessional union for employment in industry and commerce) and 
the associations for employment in industry and commerce (usually called Assédic) responsible for 
registering jobseekers, collecting employers’ contributions and paying unemployment benefit; the 
Association pour la formation professionnelle des adultes (AFPA – association for adult vocational 
education), the directions régionales du Travail, de l’Emploi et de la Formation professionnelle 
(DRTEFP – regional ministerial units of labor, employment and vocational training) present at the 
regional level, and the directions départementales du Travail, de l’Emploi et de la Formation 
professionnelle (DDTEFP –départemental ministerial units of labor, employment and vocational 
training at the départemental level), the decentralized services responsible for implementing 
employment policy on behalf of their tutelary employment ministry. This diversity reflects the fact 
that the Employment service was, until recently, conducted by a system that combined professional 
bodies, public establishments and government ministerial organizations.  
There are therefore three organizational components in the Employment sector.  
First, there are the administrative directorates of the Ministry of Employment. At national level, they 
have, since 2012, been part of the same ministry as the health services, under the Ministry of 
Employment, Labor and Health. In this connection, three central administrations need to be 
mentioned: the directorate of Research, Analysis and Statistics (DARES), the Central Directorate of 
Labor (DGT), the Central Directorate for Employment and Vocational Training (DGEFP), the 
Directorate of Central Administration and Service Modernisation (DAGEMO). At the decentralized 
level, the regional ministerial units of Labor, Employment and Vocational Training (DRTEFP) at the 
regional level, and the départemental ministerial units of Labor, Employment and Vocational Training 
(DDTEFP) at the départemental level, merged in 2009 into new directorates called Regional 
Directorates for Business, Competition, Consumption, Labor and Employment (DIRECCTE). These new 
decentralized units (Bezes, Pierru, 2012) therefore combine staff from the Ministry of Employment 
and Labor (workplace inspectors and controllers), responsible for labor monitoring policies and work 
reintegration policies, along with staff from the Ministry of the Economy and Industry, responsible 
for economic development or fraud prevention. Because of these amalgamated structures and in so 
far as employment is a very significant crosscutting issue, it is not impossible that staff from other 
ministries (in particular at the decentralized level) may have answered that they were, amongst other 
things, responsible for employment matters.  
The second organizational component of the employment sector relates to entities which, in the 
French context, are equivalent to agencies. Alongside government ministerial administrative 
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directorates, there is also now the “Pôle Emploi”, the public establishment responsible for 
employment affairs, which is the fruit of the amalgamation of the services of the National 
Employment Agency (ANPE), which support jobseekers, and those of the Assedics, which pay 
unemployment benefits. Act No. 2008-126 of 13 February 2008 on reforms to the public employment 
service was adopted on 31 January 2008. It provides for the merger of the ANPE and the Assedic 
network, and the possible integration of the career advice function of the Association for Adult 
Vocational Training (AFPA). The name of the new body, Pôle Emploi, was chosen in October 2008. 
Pôle Emploi was created 19 December 2008 at its first board meeting. In the initial COCOPS database 
for France, this body was represented at national level by its central level, and regionally by the 
regional directors. The operational dimension of the local Pôle Emploi agencies was not included. In 
addition to Pôle Emploi, the initial sample included the vocational training agencies (AFPA), 
represented by the national and regional directors, and the National Agency for the Improvement of 
Working Conditions (ANACT).  
To be consistent with the definition used for the other countries, the third component includes a few 
stakeholders in local government, in this case the region. In fact, the “employment” role is partly 
shared by the independent regional authorities. These have functions relating to vocational training 
and support for economic innovation. In the initial database, we included one or two people 
responsible for these matters in each region.  
Sample 
More responses were received from the employment sector than from the other sectors, which 
reflect the fact that it is widely represented at local level where we find a high response rate 
associated with the reaction to the reorganizations. On the one hand, given that the sector is 
relatively homogeneous and the overall response rate was very high, it can be deduced that the data 
relating to this sector are very reliable. On the other hand, analyzing the employment sectors reveals 
much trickier for three reasons.  
The first is linked with the multiple choices for Question 2. While for the health sector, it is unlikely 
that a person who does not work directly within the ambit of the ministry of health would have 
ticked this option, very many executives in all ministries may legitimately see themselves to be 
involved in employment policy, since this issue lies at the heart of public action.  
The second reason is linked with the heterogeneous nature of the sector, which includes a central 
government administration, a small subnational component (Region) and a long-standing, largely 
independent, agency. This means that equating levels of responsibility between these components, 
and therefore attributing a weighting between the components in the initial database, is open to 
discussion.  
A third reason is linked with the highly variable response rates between these components, and in 
particular the fact that it would seem that very few Pôle Emploi executives responded, which further 
shifts the weighting between sectors. As regards Pôle Emploi, the response rate was very low. At 
most, we had 21 responses from agency executives who said they were involved in employment 
policy, out of 180 questionnaires sent to Pôle Emploi and 30 for the other agencies involved in this 
issue, i.e. a return rate of less than 10%. As regards the units of the Régions (a subnational authority), 
there were one or two employment and/or training executives per region, so we sent out 35 
questionnaires. The response rate was not greatly different from that of Pôle Emploi and the overall 
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figure for responses is negligible in comparison with total responses (4).  On the other hand, the 
response rate from the decentralized Government ministerial units, at the regional level (plus its 
départemental representative), was higher than for the survey as a whole. In the end, the final 
weighting between the sector’s different components (Government, Pôle Emploi, Région) differs 
significantly from that of the initial database, and more than three quarters of the “employment 
sector” consists of the Government administration responsible for employment. 
For all these reasons, the notion of the “employment sector” needs to be treated with the greatest 
caution in the French case.  
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9.3 Perceptions of the orientations of the reforms and the instruments used 
in both sectors 
Here, we will only look at the central issues of the features of the reforms and their impact. The 
tables provided report the percentages of respondents who ticked boxes 6 and 7 in a scale of 1 to 7 
and therefore express their clear approval of the statement in question.  
Figure 28. Importance of reform trends,% of responses 6 and 7  “important trend” 
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Figure 29. Use of different management-instruments.% of responses 6 and 7 ‘used to a large extent’. 
 
The responses reflect the specificities of the two sectors, i.e. the reforms that have been particularly 
significant in that sector.  
Health – In the Health sector, agency creation is identified very clearly by senior executives as a 
strong trend (more than 80%). This response is not surprising in that the health sector is doubly 
affected by the creation of agencies. Firstly, there is regular creation and reform of healthcare safety 
agencies (e.g. the National Agency for the Safety of Medicines and Health Products, created in 2012 
to replace the French Agency for the Safety of Medicines and Health Products (Afssaps), following 
the Médiator drug scandal. Secondly, the sector was reorganized in 2009 with the creation of the 
regional health agencies (ARS), combining the former decentralized ministerial services and regional 
social security bodies within the same organization. It is equally no surprise that the merger 
initiatives are even more identified than for government as a whole, because of the scale of the 
merger momentum arising from the creation of the regional health agencies. The ARS are therefore 
simultaneously associated with the issue of agencies and with the issue of mergers. The responses of 
the senior executives from the health sector also suggest other specificities. The creation of the ARS 
resulted in staff with different employment conditions working together, i.e. civil servants working 
alongside staff governed by the collective Health-Insurance sector collective agreement, which is 
similar to private sector status. This “mix” may explain the slightly more significant responses on the 
perception of flexible working practices. Much more markedly than for the State in general and for 
the employment sector (almost 3 times more), citizen participation is also considered as a significant 
trend by almost 40% of the respondents in this sector. This impact is probably explained by the fact 
that the Hospital, Patients, Health and Regions (HPST) Act of 2009 contains a section on patient 
rights. It includes a series of measures focusing specifically on increasing transparency in relation to 
patients, as well as increased representation for users on hospital oversight boards, the publication 
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of quality indicators and an enhanced role for the Committees for User Relations and Healthcare 
Quality (CRUQPC). Another explanation is the increased influence of patients’ associations. It should 
also be noted that, as with Employment, respondents from the Health sector place above-average 
emphasis on the power of systems of collaboration, cooperation and partnerships between public 
actors. This response is not surprising insofar as the health sector relies on multiple state bodies 
(ministries, hospitals, etc.) and on other types of public bodies such as the health insurance funds.  
Employment – The employment sector too has, in the past, been affected by agencies with the 
creation, in 1967, of the former national employment agency (ANPE), initially a small structure 
dedicated to employment development initiatives, but which became a large unemployment 
organization. This shift happened a long time ago, and was understandably not perceived by the 
respondents to be a new trend in the sector. On the other hand, here again there have been mergers 
specific to the Employment sector, since the major reform was the previously mentioned creation of 
Pôle Emploi, through the amalgamation of the ANPE and the Assédics in December 2008. Pôle Emploi 
is also known for having considerably developed management by results, a fact that is apparent in 
the increased perception by respondents that this is a strong trend (43% of Employment 
respondents). As in the health sector, involves multiple public actors: the Ministry and its 
decentralized units at regional level, a public establishment like Pôle Emploi, AFPA (association for 
adult vocational training), employment centres that pool several dedicated employment bodies and 
our under the responsibility of local authorities, etc. It is therefore unsurprising to find this item 
(collaboration/partnership) identified as significant by respondents in the sector. On the other hand, 
it is also significant that the development of external partnerships and contracting out are more 
present in this sector. However, it is worth noting that e-government practices, more associated with 
administrative activity, seem to be less developed in both the Employment and Health sectors.  
The differences between the health/employment sectors, on the one hand, and the State on the 
other, is less marked with regard to management tools.  
Nonetheless, the use of business plans is a practice particularly highlighted at the Ministry of Health, 
which reflects the method of contracting between the central administration and the regional health 
agencies (ARS). Similarly, benchmarking approaches are more present here than elsewhere, in a 
sector where there is more debate about methods than elsewhere at international level (Pierru, 
2012). Paradoxically, the health sector seems to have been less exposed to the development of user 
orientated initiatives such as one-stop shops, satisfaction surveys or even quality-based 
management.  
By contrast, the employment sector stands out principally through user-orientated instruments, such 
as user satisfaction surveys, one-stop shops and quality approaches, which is consistent with the 
sector’s very strong service ethos. Here again, these responses reflect the reform processes that have 
been introduced in the sector. In 1990, the first service contract between the Government and the 
ANPE, called the progress contract, included funding for a satisfaction survey of users, employers and 
jobseekers, with the aim of increasing the level of customer satisfaction. The survey was conducted 
by an “independent” polling institute. This survey is still retained as an indicator of the effectiveness 
of employment policy at Pôle Emploi. As regards the quality approach, this was officially introduced 
at the ANPE in the late 1990s, but approaches of this kind had been established implicitly for some 
time previously.   
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9.4. Perceptions of the impacts of the reforms 
 
To finish, let us look at how the effects of the reforms are perceived.  
Employment – Generally speaking, we find a high degree of pessimism amongst executives in the 
Employment sector – greater than in the State sector in general and than in the health sector – since 
the percentages of respondents who consider that there has been an improvement in any given item 
are low (figure below). This pessimism emerges for a large number of items: a decline in efficiency, 
quality of service, innovation, the consistency and effectiveness of policies, transparency, citizen 
participation and red tape. On all these subjects, the perceptions of the respondents in the 
Employment sector are more negative than across-the-board (e.g. favorable responses by executives 
in the Employment sector are few and the scores lower than those of civil servants in general on 
virtually all items). The assessments on costs and efficiency and quality of service are particularly 
negative, and significantly more negative than those of executives from other sectors: they would 
seem to constitute a powerful critique of the major reform in the sector, the creation of Pôle Emploi 
in 2008. From the results of the survey, it is legitimate to talk of a certain “malaise” amongst senior 
executives in the Employment sector. It is also possible that this malaise is generated by the poor 
results of France’s policies to combat unemployment.  
Figure 30. Different performance dimensions – % of responses 6 and 7 ‘It has improved significantly’. 
 
Health – A sort of pessimism is also apparent in the Health sector: it applies to the perception of staff 
motivation, equality of access to services, impartial treatment for citizens or the attractiveness of the 
public health sector. However, it should be underlined that several items attract slightly more 
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positive (less critical) assessments than those made by the other public service executives (and 
particularly those in the Employment sector).  The perception of the trend in citizen participation is 
very significantly more optimistic than the average for the public sector as a whole. Similarly, 
efficiency, quality of service, innovation, the consistency or effectiveness of health policies, are 
judged as slightly above-average, i.e. slightly more positively, than for the administration of the 
whole. One possible explanation for this more positive perception could be the fact that the creation 
of the ARS marks a strengthening of the role of the State in health insurance. It is possible that the 
senior executives surveyed in the health sector take a positive view of this reform, because it 
restores management power to the State, hence the favorable view of the issues of consistency, 
effectiveness and even cost reduction.  
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10. Conclusion 
 
The French trajectory of administrative reforms can be characterized by some specific 
features. First, administrative reform policies were not initially designed with such a radical, political 
and paradigmatic turn than was observed in some other European countries (specifically UK), apart 
for the Sarkozy period. Second, the diffusion of NPM ideas did occur but through a more gradual and 
low-profile way with a real intensification in the 2000s due to two major reasons: the 2001 Budget 
Act introducing performance management on a systematic basis and the deterioration of public 
finances leading to more structural measures of reorganization by mergers under the Sarkozy 
presidency. Third, the French trajectory of administrative reforms has then to be considered on the 
long term in order to emphasize its specificities. Doing so, three major reforms can be emphasized. 
The initial, dominant and resilient trend of administrative reforms has been decentralization policies, 
respectively in 1981-1983 and 2003-2004, representing a considerable departure from two 
Napoleonic features: centralisation and uniformity. Performance management techniques are now 
part of the French bureaucracy: they were first introduced gradually by the 1980s but a systematic 
performance management system was established after the 2001 Budget Act putting a greater 
emphasis on hierarchy and control through managerial tools in the steering of public organisations, 
including semi-autonomous entities like the établissements publics. In the French context, the newly 
introduced managerial tools have been used to reinforce the centralising mechanisms already at 
work within the state and have simultaneously complemented the previous ‘Napoleonic’ hierarchical 
means of steering and control. At last, in the political context of the Sarkozy presidency, along with a 
financial crisis, strong leadership and a new government coalition, French state local units were also 
drastically reformed through mergers and the reinforcement of prefects (Bezes, Le Lidec, 2010). This 
reform generated a hybrid model. On the one hand, it gave new inter-ministerial roles to existing 
institutions like state local units and prefects. On the other hand, it also rediscovered and reactivated 
the ‘Napoleonic’ logic of prefects and a political hierarchy. So, important administrative changes did 
occur in the French public administration. Although many historical features of the French state have 
been maintained, they were also sometimes weakened, redirected or challenged by the reforms. This 
being said, the salient research issues are to understand the variations of their effects – in intensity 
and contents - according to the different levels and positions within the French bureaucracy: 
executives in central administrations, in agencies (établissements publics) and in ministerial local 
units at the regional and départemental levels.  
The results of the COCOPS executive survey illustrate this complex picture and provide 
interesting elements to observe changes as well as resilience.  
Some traditional features of the French top civil service are emphasized. The weight of 
higher education diplomas and of grands écoles (among them the ENA) is revealed by the score of 
postgraduate degrees, much higher than the overall COCOPS sample. Background educational 
disciplines reveal the importance of law political science and public administration but also show that 
France’s big engineering schools are another significant player. French respondents show the 
strength of the career-based dimension, 68% of respondents being in the public sector for more the 
20 years but reveal some signals of medium/high mobility: 40% (less than the COCOPS sample) have 
been in their organization for more than 10 years and the high job mobility in top positions is 
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revealed by a higher score than the COCOPS average being in their position for 1 to 5 years. The data 
cannot allow to observe the famous French ‘revolving door’ mechanism (pantouflage).  
With regards to the self perception of their roles, the results record similar responses for 
“ensuring impartial implementation of laws and rules” and for “ensuring efficient use of resources”. 
These findings show that the New Public Management values of efficiency can perfectly well coincide 
with more traditional civil service values, evidence of the presence of socialization mechanisms in the 
NPM or of the influence of financial imperatives. However, when individuals are forced to decide 
between two purportedly contradictory values, we find that the principles associated with the 
traditional bureaucratic state clearly win out over market principles, and regulations or the citizen 
over results or the client. However, by contrast with the average for the COCOPS survey, the item 
“achieving results” gets quite a high score (more than “Following rules”) and, similarly, efficiency is 
valued more highly than quality, seeming to indicate the perceived weight of budgetary constraints 
and an internalization of neo-managerial values. 
A major focus of the report is the executives’ perception of their work context. Performance 
management tools are clearly perceived as day-to-day instruments with debates over whether this 
performance-based model of government is appropriate to the public sector. An interesting result 
seems to be that autonomy for top bureaucrats and managers has been an unfulfilled promise in a 
centralized state, since results reveal a global perception of lack of autonomy (below the COCOPS 
average), and are in sharp contrast, for example, with the German situation. Negative assessments of 
interministerial coordination seem to indicate that coordination works badly in the French context, 
and that French government ministries operate largely in compartments. Responses about 
politicization are quite complex to interpret and reflect the two sides of the French administration: a 
general interest orientation with strong mechanisms of politicization at the top.  
The responses about reform trends describe the reforms of the last five years, and reflect 
the sedimentary layers of previous reforms. Downsizing and mergers are the dominant trends but 
are nevertheless not equated with privatization. The respondents also underline the importance of 
focusing on outcomes and results, echoing the strength of the LOLF/Budget Act. This mapping reveals 
French specificities compare to the global COCOPS survey: more intensively perceived downsizing; 
more mergers; some comparable contents favouring cooperation and collaboration (but related to 
mergers) and e-government ; by contrast, significantly less policies in favour of transparency, open 
government, citizens participation, etc. Assessments about reform styles clearly relate to the recent 
reforms introduced under the general public policy review. All in all, the assessments are uniform 
and broadly consider that the reforms are top-down, substantial, little concerned with negotiation 
and very much about cost-cutting and savings.  
On the organizational level, the management instruments seen by most respondents as 
being very significant in the French context are interestingly the same as Germany: staff performance 
interviews, management by objectives and results and business planning. A majority of respondents 
– like in the COCOPS global sample - do not see them as linked with mechanisms of 
punishment/discipline/rewards. However, a large number of instruments that come out of the New 
Public Management doctrinal toolbox are nevertheless largely seen as not being widespread: cost 
accounting systems, the decentralization of financial decisions and staffing decisions, performance-
related pay and user satisfaction surveys. At the individual level, results show that indicators are used 
more as “warning signals” than as operational methods of improving performance.  
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An important aspect of the present study is to obtain systematic information on how top 
bureaucrats assess the impact of the various public sector reforms on an organizational and policy 
level.  
The general view of the performance of public administration is broadly balanced, with a 
slight negative bias, clearly less positive than the global mean of the COCOPS Sample. This essentially 
balanced view does not preclude sharp variations according to where the changes strike and the 
performance associated with specific reforms. In details, strong favorable assessments, indicating an 
improvement, are few and relate to costs and innovation. This suggests a fairly restricted view of the 
improvements, since the first item reflects the numerous initiatives in the RGPP designed to cut 
spending, and the second refers to technological changes (e-government, Internet). By contrast, a 
large number of areas are perceived as having clearly declined. Certain perceptions of decline relate 
to the “external” effects arising from administrative action: deterioration of social cohesion along 
with citizen trust in government and citizen participation. The other clear perceptions of 
deterioration relate to the “internal” negative perception of the public sector and of the morale of its 
staff: staff motivation, attractiveness of the public sector and red tape. These results indicate a 
certain malaise amongst senior executives and the sense of a government that is enfeebled and out 
of touch. These negative perceptions make the French case quite distinct from the global means of 
the COCOPS sample.  
The questions on social capital and trust are more difficult to interpret, because they do not 
support the fairly negative assessments of staff motivation and the attractiveness of government 
service analyzed above. The responses are largely positive, with few sharp differences, possibly a 
little conformist and uniform in their conclusions. However, there is a difference between the items 
that generate more unanimity, relating to interpersonal relations and trust in staff, and the items 
that arouse more balanced responses which, for their part, relate to the collective aspect of the 
organization. The questions on workplace satisfaction also draw broadly positive responses, which 
need to be carefully interpreted in the light of the social and administrative group concerned: senior 
executives whose important jobs and high status understandably generate positive views. 
Apart from central government, the survey also targeted more specifically the health and 
employment sectors. With regards to health, some specific trends and instruments of reforms have 
been emphasized by respondents: agency creation is a strong trend in the health sector as well as 
mergers. Much more markedly than for the central government in general and for the employment 
sector (almost 3 times more), citizen participation is also considered as a significant trend in this 
sector. A sort of pessimism is apparent in the Health sector: it applies to the perception of staff 
motivation, equality of access to services, impartial treatment for citizens or the attractiveness of the 
public health sector. However, several items attract slightly more positive (less critical) assessments 
than those made by the other public service executives (and particularly those in the Employment 
sector): citizen participation but also efficiency, quality of service, innovation and the consistency or 
effectiveness of health policies. In the Employment sector, specific identified trends are mergers, 
management by results and collaboration/partnership. It is also significant that the development of 
external partnerships and contracting out are more present in this sector. Equally significant is the 
fact that the employment sector stands out principally through user-orientated instruments, such as 
user satisfaction surveys, one-stop shops and quality approaches, which is consistent with the 
sector’s very strong service ethos. Generally speaking, we find a high degree of pessimism amongst 
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executives in the Employment sector – greater than in the State sector in general and than in the 
health sector. This pessimism emerges for a large number of items: a decline in efficiency, quality of 
service, innovation, the consistency and effectiveness of policies, transparency, citizen participation 
and red tape. From the results of the survey, it is legitimate to talk of a certain “malaise” amongst 
senior executives in the Employment sector. 
Overall, the results do show that administrative reforms have strongly affected the French 
public administration, thus generating a great number of related problems and side effects in terms 
of steering, control and coordination. However, the survey does not identify a clear perception of 
improved outcomes while emphasizing elements of ‘malaise’ for the top bureaucrats.  
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